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# West Europe Report

No. 2235



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## HUNTZINGER ON PEACE MOVEMENT, FOREIGN POLICY, NATO

Brussels KNACK in Dutch 28 Sep 83 pp 75,77

[Interview with Jacques Huntzinger, national secretary for international relations of the French Socialist Party, by Mathieu Desclin: "The Negotiations Must Succeed"; date and place not given]

[Text] The East-West negotiations on limiting nuclear arms in Western Europe have thrown a glaring light on the contrasting views on this subject held on the one hand by the United States and on the other hand by the European countries. They have never been this far apart.

In this context, France has taken a very different position. Having been governed for 2 years by a leftist administration, a member of the Atlantic Alliance but yet outside NATO, it has taken a position in favor of deploying Euromissiles. Is this a tactical detour, a basic review of former positions, or simply an adjustment of principles to the realities inherent in the exercise of power?

We asked Jacques Huntzinger about this. Huntzinger is the national secretary for international relations of the French Socialist Party [PS]. Having been a member of the political committee of the PS for years, he is something like the minister of foreign affairs of the party, and in this capacity he provided the views of the PS concerning 2 years of foreign policy by the French government.

Question: Can the Socialist Party recognize itself in the foreign policy that has been conducted for the last 2 years by the current leftist government?

Huntzinger: Yes. The government's foreign policy is clearly integrated into the socialist tradition of ideas. Even more, I would dare to state that it is the area in which our ideas come out most clearly. Support to the emancipation movement in Southern Africa, defense of the people in Central America and Afghanistan, refusal to follow the "logic of the blocs" concerning among other things Poland, aid to developing countries, France's proposals in terms of the New Economic Order and North-South negotiations, the new relationships among the countries of the Mediterranean region: these are many illustrations of the ideals adhered to by our party.

Question: The "logic of the blocs" not only involves Poland, but also the arms race and the threat of nuclear war. In response to this threat, a strong pacifist movement has developed in Western Europe. Now Francois Mitterrand is defending a number of positions which are limping painfully behind those of many European socialist parties.

Huntzinger: I believe that the French government position has run into a great deal of misunderstanding abroad. Our opinion naturally differs from that of the pacifists, but there are also misunderstandings. Francois Mitterrand said in Switzerland that the peace movement is not homogeneous and that consequently we cannot make an overall negative judgement about it. But in spite of its confused and ambiguous character, it expresses a feeling, which is really alive, of rejection of any threat of war in Europe. We also want to reduce the chances of a limited nuclear war in Europe. But who created these chances? What conditions should be met to prevent our continent from once again becoming the scene of an even worse slaughter?

Those are the questions that should be debated. For our part we believe that the deployment of SS-20's by the Soviet Union has seriously disturbed the military balance in Europe. Should we then simply accept the American nuclear missiles? Our answer is and remains: no Pershings, no SS-20's. First of all then, the Russian nuclear missiles aimed at Europe must be dismantled. A situation in which the Soviet arsenal remains intact and America looks on passively is unthinkable. Western Europe would pay the price. This is why it is so imperative for the Geneva negotiations to succeed. I believe that we could reach a broad agreement on this view, even with the peace movement, because after all we are striving for the same goal: the strengthening of peace in Europe. We must not even stop at the question of the nuclear missiles, but get to work and also tackle the problem of conventional arms. Disarmament should also produce concrete results in this area.

Freeze

Question: You want the Soviets to take the first step. And yet, the socialist government in Greece for example and the British Laborites are pleading for disarmament if only in part of Europe, as a beginning toward general disarmament. They are, among other things, advocates of "nuclear free zones." Does your position contrast sharply with this?

Huntzinger: Absolutely. We do not believe that unilateral disarmament could be the beginning of general disarmament.

Question: Of course, you cannot make any progress when you are of the opinion that the West is hopelessly behind the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union naturally calls this laughable, but many others -- I am thinking specifically of your party colleague Admiral Sanguinetti -- also share this opinion.

Huntzinger: It is absolutely no laughable matter. The American sea based nuclear force is often added to reach the conclusion that they amply compensate for the new Russian missiles. But that will not wash. It involves no less and no more than double counting. As a matter of fact, the Polaris 3 and the Poseidon fall within the scope of the SALT agreements because they are



considered to be strategic arms. After all, we on this side do not take the intercontinental missiles on the other side into account, do we? Why a policy of two measures and two weights? For the time being we have nothing to place opposite the Euro-strategic equipment of the Russians. Hence we are justified in saying that the SS-20's will have to be dismantled first before we can seriously talk about peace in Europe. If they really serve no purpose, this should be easy. And if this is not the case, then they are a danger to Western Europe.

Question: Such reasoning obviously also applies to the French and British nuclear missiles, which also weigh heavily in the nuclear balance. Yuri Andropov's recent proposals concerning the limiting of SS-20's explicitly took them into account.

Huntzinger: I am extremely flattered that so much interest is being shown in the French and British nuclear arsenals. If you want to talk about this, then you really must remain serious. After all, calculations should now be made in terms of the number of nuclear warheads and not nuclear missiles. If you do that, then you get an impressive figure for the Russians. The whole French and British nuclear arsenal is easily compensated for by a few SS-20's, while 300 SS-20's have been deployed. Besides, an agreement would not involve the complete dismantling of all 300 SS-20's, but a significant reduction of them. Are the Soviets willing to do this? That is the question we are asking ourselves.

Question: Senator Ted Kennedy himself has proposed the inclusion of the French and British nuclear forces in the negotiations between East and West...

Huntzinger: The "freeze proposal" is evidence of the interest which Ted Kennedy has always had in arms control. It is not uninteresting, but we would like to ask him to pay equal attention to the Russians.

Question: The Greek socialists want to withdraw from NATO; the Laborites are pleading for a nuclear free Great Britain; the German social democrats reject Reagan's "zero option." Is it your conclusion then that they refuse to shoulder their responsibility, that they are bowing before the peace boys and girls who are playing the Russians' game?

Huntzinger: I do not believe that you should throw the positions of the parties referred to into a heap. And to make it perfectly clear, I do not believe in the so-called fable of Russian manipulation. The pacifism is sincere. The only question I would like to ask our European comrades is whether they are still willing to be part of NATO. You have to follow your logic to the end. From an historical point of view, the establishment of NATO meant acceptance of the American nuclear umbrella. How do the NATO partners see this form of defense today? And do they want to continue benefiting from it? All of them are asking themselves what is to happen with their security? They no longer want to depend on the big powers for this, and are trying to develop alternatives such as the option of "regional security zones," nuclear disarmament... The classic East-West dichotomy is being questioned. Spain, for example, does not want to tighten the ties with NATO. You can understand the Greek position. But then they must clearly define the conditions under which they want to see their security guaranteed.

As far as the peace movement is concerned it must also examine the problem of European security. And this security is not guaranteed by a simple rejection of war. You know, in 1938 we opposed the war with all possible pacifist means, there was Munich... and 2 years later we were in the middle of trouble anyway.

We in France have been strongly marked by the fact that an inspiring but naive attitude did not keep war away, on the contrary. The contrast between the two camps is a reality and our presence is equally a reality. The question is: should we follow this logic, should we act against both camps, or should we alter the East-West configuration as it emerged from the Yalta agreements? In my opinion, developing the conditions to get out of this opposition is a much more important task, which falls to the current generation, than to go ahead with a unilateral disarmament which remains lost on the other side.

Question: How are you going to tread that path, concretely speaking?

Huntzinger: We must make sure that the Geneva negotiations succeed. We must play on the idea of "regional security zones," thus for example make sure that negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union get under way on their mutual military withdrawal from the Mediterranean Sea.

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CSO: 3614/3

## COUNTRY REACTS TO ETA MURDER OF ARMY CAPTAIN

## Nationwide Anti-ETA Protests

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 21 Oct 83 pp 1, 15

[Text] Yesterday in Bilbao, in an atmosphere of restrained tension, Defense Minister Narcis Serra presided over the funeral of Captain of Pharmacy Alberto Martin, assassinated by ETA Political-Military Eighth Assembly. Added yesterday to the notes of condemnation from the entire political and social spectrum, registered the very day of his death, were the first protect actions in the form of work stoppages in numerous production centers. Public demonstrations under a common motto "Everyone against ETA" are called for today and tomorrow in Madrid, Bilbao and other points in Spain. Finally, in the Biscayan capital, there will be a unitary demonstration, the PSOE having joined the convocation of the other parties.

In Madrid, the procession will be led by the vice president of the government, two ministers, the presidents of the Constitutional Court, the Council of Judicial Power, the Congress and the Senate, as well as the top leaders of the political parties, unions and business associations.

Efforts were being made yesterday to assure the presence in Madrid of some outstanding personality from the Episcopal Conference, and the organizers even expressed the wish that representatives of the army could participate in the demonstration in civilian clothes, since military personnel are not permitted to participate in that type of event in uniform. Defense Ministry sources indicated that no word on the matter had been received in that department.

The demonstration called for the Spanish capital will begin at 7:30 p.m. at the Plaza de Colon and it will follow the Paseo de la Castellana, finishing up at the Nuevo Ministerios, where Pedro Lain, president of the Royal Academy, will read a declaration signed by the organizers.

Other demonstrations and work stoppages have been called for today in various parts of Spain. The pharmacies will close between noon and 2 p.m.



The four members of the Spanish Security Forces who were arrested in France in an incident with a member of ETA-pm have been put in prison and are accused of a crime of "premeditated violence with damage," which under French legislation is punishable with a maximum of 4 years imprisonment. Their defense attorney has presented an appeal and has asked for their provisional release.

A united demonstration will take place Saturday at 12:30 p.m. in Bilbao, the theme being "With the people against ETA." Just when it seemed that it was impossible to have a joint action condemning violence--because yesterday morning two convocations were circulating, one by the PSOE and a coalition of the Right for today Friday, and another by the PNV [Basque Nationalist Party], Basque Left, PCE and CCOO [Workers Commissions] for tomorrow Saturday--the Socialists joined the majority convocation. Late yesterday evening, after learning the news of the attack perpetrated in Renteria in which Candido Cuna lost his life, the PSE [Basque Socialist Party], which had insisted on the advantage of including a phrase in support of the army in the central theme, joined the convocation of nationalists and communists. After the marathon session of political parties that took place Thursday in Bilbao, in which the PSE proposed to the others in attendance that a phrase in support of the army be included in the central theme of the demonstration, the first opportunity was lost for convoking a united demonstration in the Basque Country against violence. Nevertheless, the PNV, Basque Left, PCE and CCOO kept hoping that yesterday there could be an accommodation so that the two agreements would not lead to the holding of two demonstrations.

But the appearance yesterday morning of an announcement in the Basque press, signed by the PSOE, in which it unilaterally convoked a demonstration for today Friday, caused surprise among the other Basque political forces, including the coalition, which had shown that it was in favor of having a demonstration with the theme proposed by the socialists, so that all of the groups concurred in criticizing the "absolute dullness of the PSOE."

The PNV, Basque Left, PCE and CCOO called together the news media to indicate that they had nothing against the army but that to mobilize against terrorism it is not necessary to make explicit support for the army in the central theme of a demonstration, for "it involves an institution that does not need praise; it is fulfilling its duty, we hope that it will continue to do so and that is all," according to the PNV spokesman.

For their part, the Basque PCE representatives said that they did not understand why the PSOE had not proposed the inclusion of a phrase in support of the army in the theme of the unitary demonstration in Madrid, as they did in the Basque Country.

Late yesterday evening, after learning of the attack perpetrated against the baker Candido Cuna in Renteria, the socialists changed their position. Ricardo Garcia Damborenea, spokesman in Biscay, indicated that after the last incident, they were not going to fall "into the frivolity of dividing the convocation to mobilize against terrorism." The socialist spokesman insisted that in the Basque Country, "where, for the first time, a member of the armed forces has died at the hands of ETA," a demonstration should be held explicitly in support of the army, in spite of the fact that in the rest of Spain there is no special mention of the armed forces in the central theme of the demonstrations.

## Military for Massive Crackdown

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 21 Oct 83 p 14

[Text] Madrid--In recent hours, the military command has been receiving with great sensitivity the different reactions of units and quarters of the armed forces on the assassination of Pharmacy Capt Alberto Martin. Most of the commentaries concur in the following aspects: general indignation, total support for any method that the police may use to confront the terrorist offensive, making illegal political parties and organizations that support the terrorist groups, sanctions against the communications media that support the postulates of these groups and more toughness in the penal code.

Most of the opinions, which are merely simple commentary in the officers' quarters reflect the profound uneasiness that the cited attack has produced among the military. Those responsible in the units are determining the opinion of their subordinates, with the purpose of relaying the information to their superiors so that the defense minister can then be informed.

In the last 48 hours, the military command has not known any other reaction than that of the commentary in the quarters. In apparently one of the units of greatest conflict, the Brunete First Armored Division, this time the word of the assassination of Captain Martin was taken with less passion than on previous occasions. Military media assigned to their units reminded this newspaper that the Armored Division suffered a loss on its day of terrorist wrath in the person of its top officer, Gen Victor Lago, who died in an attack later claimed by ETA-Military.

An officer of the Armored Division commented to this newspaper yesterday that the death of Captain Martin came at a time of mourning in its units, for one of its staff officers died recently during maneuvers. "What we feel is more than indignation; we are more skeptical than ever," he said, "and it is not on account of the attack, which is a brutal act, but because of this continuous litany of condemnation that serves no purpose. I believe that one has to be hard on those who seek to impose on us the law of terror and not go the way of understanding and normality."

Luis Saenz Larumbe, the district commander of Zaragoza, declined to make any declaration or comment on the assassination of Capt Martin Barrios. When this newspaper insisted, sources in the district command indicated that it was not usual for the district command to make statements.

Ricard Onate, the district commander of Granada, however, was more explicit and declared that his opinion could not be different from that shared by all the members of the armed forces and the Spanish people: "There is total indignation on account of the vileness and cowardliness of the assassination of Capt Martin Barrios, carried out in great wrath and coldness, which makes clear the miserable nature of those guilty of such an execrable murder."

"But I prefer not to make any comments, for the communications media are full of them. It is time to make some determinations so that this tragedy can be ended by those who are entrusted with the responsibility of doing that," said Miguel Fontela, the district commander of the Canary Islands. Against making any statements in this case was Manuel Saavedra Palmeyro, the district commander of Seville, who declined to make any observation on the matter and referred questioners to the Council of Chiefs of Staff.

#### Indignation

The appearance of Interior Minister Jose Barrionuevo in the Spanish Directorate General of Radio Broadcasting and Television has received favorable comments in some military circles of this last military region.

In Valladolid, seat of one of the most difficult Spanish military regions, there was an atmosphere of grief, indignation, great uneasiness and contained rage. Nevertheless, there is no word that there have been any special meetings in the quarters. Throughout the day, it was impossible to communicate directly with Ricardo Rivas Nadal, commander of the Seventh Military Region, to learn his opinion on the death of Capt Martin Barrios.

Yesterday, in the units of the Third Military Region seated in Valencia, there was an atmosphere of normality, even though the assassination of the pharmacy captain had caused profound preoccupation and indignation. Military media characterized the event as "repugnant," especially for being against defenseless persons, and they considered it too early to know what repercussions this terrorist act can have in the military family.

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CSO: 3548/51

## CASAS DESCRIBES SECURITY POSTURE FOR BASQUE COUNTRY

Guipuzcoa EGIN in Spanish 10 Oct 83 p 4

[Interview with Enrique Casas, spokesman for the government on the Security Council of the Basque Country by EFE, date and place unspecified]

[Text] Vitoria (Agencias)--The spokesman for the government on the Security Council of the Basque Country, Enrique Casas, has declared that "the fight against terrorism will not be an exclusive domain of the Autonomous Police when a state problem is involved."

In statements made to the "EFE" agency, Enrique Casas, who is also a senator of the PSE-PSOE [Spanish Socialist Party-Spanish Socialist Workers Party] and representative in the Basque parliament, draws up a balance sheet on the operation of the Security Council, states that the "Zen" plan has no direct influence on the deployment plan of the Ertzantza and points out that there will be no territorial substitution of one police force for another, but rather that both will be adapted to the assignment of their domains as indicated by the statute.

## Positive Balance Sheet of the Security Council

[Question] What sort of balance sheet would you draw up on the operation of the Council since the PSOE came to power?

[Answer] I would draw up a positive balance sheet. With the preceding government, definite difficulties had been produced in the operation of the Council, but, as I see it, this happened for structural reasons rather than anything else. Since the arrival of the new government, we have faced the task of making it function in a serious way, handling problems with sincerity and mutual loyalty.

Another thing is that there has been ambiguity and indecision on the part of the Basque government representatives when it comes to facing a series of matters, as for example, the question of the "Zen" plan. They were given a report and the evaluation made by them in the Council was relatively positive and, even so, it seems that their party, the PNV [Basque Nationalist Party], is by no means in total agreement.

[Question] Do you think that the Council is proving to be an effective organization?

[Answer] It is carrying out the missions assigned to it by the statute. At any rate, it is unthinkable that the Council will replace either of the two governments in its function involving the police forces.

One of the functions of the Council is assigned to it by Article 17 of the Autonomy Statute, when it decrees that this organization is created explicitly to achieve coordination between the Autonomous Police and the State Security Brigades and Forces. This is the function that the Council will increasingly have to assume, especially as the Ertzantza continues to obtain more personnel and to assume the domains assigned to it by the statute.

#### "Zen" Plan Does not Interfere With Deployment Plan

[Question] What is your opinion of the Ertzantza's deployment plan?

[Answer] Before summer, the Basque government presented the plan you mention. It has been studied by the state government and the latter already has an alternative to this project. It has a proposal to make to the Security Council, which will be presented at the first meeting called.

It was anticipated before summer that the Council would meet in September, but the floods caused a change in the order of the calendar and this meeting could not be held.

[Question] Does the "Zen" plan interfere with the deployment plan of the Autonomous Police?

[Answer] Not directly, since the "Zen" plan is one thing and the deployment plan is another. The latter will respond to definite criteria that the central government and the Basque government have to negotiate. Now then: yes, there will be some indirect interference, since collaboration between the two police forces is necessary.

[Question] Will not the coordination between the two police forces present some problems?

[Answer] I think it is necessary to distinguish between technical questions and political questions. There has to be technical coordination and in fact the state government has already offered the Basque government the opportunity to appoint representatives to the provincial Security Councils that exist in the civil governments. It is my understanding that they have not yet appointed definite individuals, although they said at the last meeting that they were going to do so and were going to contact the civil governors directly. We believe that it is necessary that this be carried out. That is to say, although the Autonomous Police have some personnel and a series of functions that they have assumed, we believe it is important that there be coordination of a technical nature.



## No Withdrawal of the FSE

[Question] What is going to happen to the State Brigades and Security Forces?

[Answer] That is a basic question. There are people who say that the statute is ambiguous. I believe that there are different interpretations of Article 17. Therefore, this will be one of the questions that will have to be resolved on the political level, since one of the important matters is to sketch out the final picture of the Autonomous Police. The domains of the latter are clearly marked out by Article 17: the protection of persons and property, the maintenance of public order within the autonomous territory, reserving to the Brigades and the FSE the police services which go beyond and above those of the community, such as the guarding of airports, ports, coasts, borders, custom houses, control of and departure from the national territory, etc.

Consequently, at no time can it be said that the establishment of the Autonomous Police and the assumption of domains of responsibility is going to mean the disappearance or the withdrawal of the Basque Country from the FSE. In any case, the problem is posed and that too was clear in the Security Council, in which there can be no territorial substitution of one police force for another. A distribution or an assumption of domains is what the statute is talking about. That is to say, the dividing line is the question of domains. Consequently, it is not that there is a territorial replacement of the FSE by the Autonomous Police, but rather that both will be in active service in the performance of the duties of their domains.

[Question] Does the government feel that the phenomenon of terrorism is spilling out over the borders of the Autonomous Community?

[Answer] Terrorism is a state problem, it is not a simple problem of public order and to fight it we feel that the collaboration of everyone is necessary: that of the Security Brigades and Forces and of all citizens, consequently, this will not be an exclusive domain of the Autonomous Police. It is a domain that spills out over the borders of what may be public order.

[Question] That is to say, for example, that with the implementation of this plan, the Civil Guard will be able to set up check-points on the highways in its pursuit of persons guilty of the crime of terrorism...

[Answer] Evidently, evidently.

[Question] Will this not create problems with the Ertztantzta?

[Answer] I do not think it has to create them. If it does, that will be one of the questions in which the Security Council will have to intervene.

## No Possibility of Civil Commands for Ertzantza

[Question] The deployment plan of the Ertzantza anticipates some 6,500 police for 1987. In view of this, is it not going to mean that there will be too many police, if the effective forces of the FSE are added?

[Answer] It is possible that the number of police will be reduced, but I do not want to say anything further because, in a way, I would be contesting the deployment plan of the Basque government ahead of time and that is something I do not wish to do, out of pure courtesy. The problem is not the number of the police, but of their adequacy with respect to the domain involved.

[Question] Are the central government and the Basque government in agreement on the nature of the domains that go beyond and above those of the community?

[Answer] There is one part that is clearly defined in the statute, but the list, which could be the definition in its final form, has not yet been prepared.

[Question] Do you believe that the Ertzantza is prepared to assume the domains of preserving public order and of fighting terrorism?

[Answer] The Ertzantza not only can, but must face the problem of public order and must also face and collaborate with the Brigades and the FSE to meet the problems of terrorism.

[Question] And are they receiving instruction for this at the academy?

[Answer] I have to give an a priori answer on this point, since it is essential to see the practical results. It is my understanding that the instruction provided at the academy is good for the purpose of accomplishing the objectives and, in any case, it is one of the problems in which coordination and collaboration among the different Security Brigades and Forces is necessary for an exchange of experiences and so that the Autonomous Police will really be, like other police, exclusively at the service of the citizens and that enforcement of the laws will be ensured.

[Question] Will it be possible to grant the wish of the Basque government with respect to its preferences in the matter of granting civil commands to military personnel for the exercising of command over the Autonomous Police?

[Answer] No, because the statute deals with this in clear terms and it is an organic law that cannot be transgressed. This does not mean that all commands, chiefs and officers of the army will fall under it, since they can also come from the Higher Police Brigade.

8089

CSO: 3548/50



## ETA-PM SEGMENT CHOOSES 'NEGOTIATION' OVER VIOLENCE

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 14 Oct 83 p 12

[Text] While ETA-pm's VIII Assembly and ETA-pm KAS-line argue over the sole right to the initials for "Political-military" in a contest of violent acts, some 20 members of these organizations have chosen to abandon terrorist activities and participate in negotiations opened over 1½ years ago by Juan Maria Bandres and the minister of the interior at that time, Juan Jose Roson. Another four or five people who belong to other ETA groups or who are acting independently of their organizations may join the group of 20 activists who have decided upon that option.

As a result of negotiations carried out in recent months by the nationalist deputy, Joseba Azharraga and the governor of Biscay himself, Julian Sancristobal, three prisoners who were members of the group called Electronic Command of ETA-pm have been released and five veteran activist refugees in France have crossed the border and have normalized the situation.

According to information published by EL DIARIO VASCO, those involved are ex-convicts Angel Re (El Astur), the Sansinenea brothers, the refugees Agurtzane Arrasate, Monica Garate, Jose Ignacio Larraza (Josepo), Amagoya Abaitua and a fifth person whose name has not been determined. Agurtzane Arrasate and Monica Garate are married to Jose Ignacio Aramayo and Alberto Mendiguren respectively, members of ETA-pm VIII who are prisoners in Nanclares de la Oca. Amagoya Abaitua is the wife of Joseba Abaitua, a historic ETA figure who has also chosen negotiations as a means of settlement.

Abaitua was, for many years, the leader of ETA-pm and was one of those implicated in the indictment of the attempt on Carrero Blanco. He took refuge in France in 1972 after having been discovered trying to cross the border accompanied by Jonen Aramburu who was killed in the fighting. Joseba Abaitua left ETA-pm during the first months of 1982 when the split occurred between the "septimos" [sevens] and ETA-pm VIII which later split again into the "octavos" (eights) and the supporters of the KAS line who were also called the "promilis" or "milikis". The remaining veteran "poli-mikis" who have chosen the new negotiations route are staying in

the country in hopes that their situation will be legalized, and some of them have appealed to private attorneys. All of them at first rejected the negotiated settlements and are now on the lists being negotiated by the senator of the PNV, Joseba Azkarraga and the civil governor of Biscay, Julian Sancristobal.

#### Humanitarian Measures

Azkarraga rejects the term "negotiation" and insists that his efforts are strictly humanitarian. "It has nothing to do with any political negotiation, but it is simply an effort of a humanitarian nature put before the national court or the corresponding ministry to determine whether a particular individual has any requisitions or charges pending against him or whether, on the other hand, he may return normally to his home." The nationalist senator has added that the number of individuals who have requested his intervention to this point has reached 25, most of them being residents of the French Basque country; some in Venezuela and Mexico.

The avenue opened by Euskadiko Ezkarra through his deputy Juan Maria Bandres, of which 112 veteran members of ETA have availed themselves, including the entire ETA-pm VIII, has so far permitted the return to Euskade of 50 refugees and the release of 35 prisoners.

The news that the members of ETA-pm VIII and ETA-pm KAS-line have abandoned activism emphasizes the weakness of these armed groups at a time when both are seeking a leading role by the kidnapping of Captain Alberto Martin and the ultimatum that civil personnel leave the headquarters of the state and army security forces, actions carried out by the "octavos" and the "promilis" respectively.

#### Resort to Kidnapping

Kidnappings, because of the publicity those acts represent for the perpetrators, have become a recourse historically utilized by ETA to resolve its internal crises, a type of "forward escape" with which to in fact press critics of the split factions and to win the sympathies of the prisoners of the organization and their territories.

Such is the case of the kidnapping of the German consul in San Sebastian, Eugene Beihl, carried out at the beginning of September 1970 on the eve of the judgement of Burgos at a time when the ETA organization was experiencing a serious internal crisis.

9787

CSO: 3548/43

## TURKISH CYPRIOTS URGE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 24 Oct 83 p 12

[Article by Sedat Ergin: "Majority Supports Independence in the TFSC"]

[Text] Nicosia - When going to Nicosia it is impossible not to visit Dr. /Fazil Kucuk/. In his office, at the /"VOICE OF THE PEOPLE"/ newspaper which he owns, his desk is covered as usual with newspapers from Turkey. Although he is almost 80, there is always a cigarette hanging from Dr. /Kucuk/'s lips.

Saying /"I have nothing to add to what Mr. Rauf says, I am one of those who approve of the path followed by Rauf"/, he notes that a declaration of independence is imperative for the TFSC. /"Not a single airplane lands on our airports, not a single ship calls at our ports. This cannot go on."/says he.

Well, can TFSC president /Rauf Denktas/ declare independence despite Turkey's opposition?

Dr. /Kucuk/ gives the following reply:

/"Since 1948 I have moved in the same direction as Turkey. My policy cannot be outside Turkey's policy."/ According to Dr. /Kucuk/ /"Turkey also wants the declaration of independence but is waiting for the right time."/

In fact Dr. /Kucuk/'s words reflect the point of view of a large majority of the Turkish Cypriot population. During the 3 days we spent in Nicosia we saw that, generally speaking, the people had lost almost all hope of an agreement with the Greeks. A large majority believes in the necessity of a declaration of independence and supports the policy of Denktas.

For instance, retired teacher /Ozden Bektasoglu/, 44, believes that /"We have even waited too long."/ As for Turkey's opposition to a declaration of independence, he says /"That is Turkey's problem."/ Housewife /Lamia Paker/, 55, is a woman of few words /"I consider a declaration of independence to be apt. I no longer believe that we can come to terms with the Greeks."/

/Ahmet Altinoren/ is a cobbler by day. His limited resources forced him to work as a waiter in the evenings, at the /"Zir Restaurant."/While waiting on other tables /Ahmet Altinoren/ also comes from time to time to our table to express his views: "After the infidels'latest deed at the United Nations, this has become

a must. I am an uneducated man but I see it as inescapable."/ And how about Turkey's position? /"If Turkey says yes, it can happen. If it went against Turkey, our savior, how could one do it?"/ he asks.

#### If the People Want It

/Orhan Delliirmak/, 41, is one of the Turkish Cypriot people's eminent bards. He closed down his small tavern on Republic Square and turned it into a National Lottery vendor's booth. /"I have ended as a peddler of hope."/ he says. He defines himself as an /"enlightened leftist./ What he says is of a nature to confirm the trend toward independence which is increasingly gaining ground within the leftist movement in the TFSC: /"It is a fact that there are two separate populations in Cyprus. And the right for populations to determine their own fate is a right of our times. Starting from that point and taking into consideration that the majority is in favor of independence, I too think along the same lines as the people."/

/Delliirmak/ says: /"I do not that Turkey thinks differently from the Turkish Cypriots on this matter. I believe that both the Turkish people and their Turkish government will see independence as fitting for our dissenting people. However, I am of the opinion that before declaring independence attention should be paid to Turkey."/

/Ahmet Belevi/, 40, is a famous performer of the Turkish Cypriot population. He represented the TFSC in the 1979 Golden Microphone international competition organized in Istanbul. Now he owns a music shop. On a wall of the shop one can see a picture of him he had taken with /Sezen Aksu/. /Ahmet Belevi/says: /"He who steals a minaret, prepares a sheath for it."/ [He who runs risks is ready for the consequences]. /"If the necessary measures are taken, it will be a good thing "/ he believes; as for Turkey's opposition, he says laughingly /"I do not believe that Turkey is opposed to it."/

As for tailor /Mustafa Volkan/, 44, he speaks in a different tone. According to him: /"Independence must not remain a word only."/ And he adds: /"If we do not attach ourselves elsewhere and can manage on our own, I believe that it will be a good thing."/

That is the way /"the man in the street"/ feels in the TFSC, while debates on a declaration of independence occupy international diplomacy. Even if approaches are different from time to time, the great majority of the population believes now in the necessity of a declaration of independence. However, a large majority also believes that a declaration of independence is not possible without Turkey giving the /"green light."/

In other words, in the TFSC the declaration of independence is not a view promoted by the government and the officials in power . It rests on the foundation of the people's support.

12278

CSO: 3554/47

## KHRYSTOMOS ON CHURCH ROLE, KYPRIANO

## Freedom of Church Expression

Nicosia I SIMONINI in Greek 25 Sep 83 p 1

[Text] In his sermon yesterday during the divine liturgy at Liopetri, Archbishop [Khrysostomos] strongly attacked "those who say that they represent the majority" and accused that "the Turks are provided with arguments and are encouraged in their intransigence and insistence on recognizing realities, on legalizing, that is, the facts accomplished by the invasion."

He considered a "blessing" the Kyprianou visit to New York and the clarification of the de Cuellar "guidances" and added:

"We ask, therefore, those who were enraged at the president's action, an action imposed on him by the awareness of national responsibility: Where lies the fault in such an action? Could it be that they wanted us to accept as a fact the country's partition or could it be that they wanted talks for the sake of talks in order for the occupation to be forgotten with the passing of time and for us to get used to living with it? Could it be also that they wanted to cross off and forget ancestral homes and rights since such would be the outcome had we accepted most willingly everything at the table where de Cuellar was sounding out our positions. Indeed, we cannot explain or understand such an attitude.

"It appears that many of us are not yet aware that compromising does not lead to prudence but, on the contrary, it feeds and hardens the Turkish intransigence. They have not yet understood that our willingness for continuous concessions not only failed to strengthen our position in the eyes of the foreigners but on the contrary weakened it. They have not yet understood that those who resist less suffer greater injustice; that if Waldheim's and de Cuellar's soundings aimed at partition it is because we gave them the right to believe--through our attitude for concessions--that we were ready to accept partition.

"The Church, regardless of whether some people want to be silent, cannot but express its opposition to such an attitude for concessions which reaches the boundaries of irresponsibility; because it offers the Turks strong arguments and weakens and undermines the right of our struggle.



"The Church feels the pain and is concerned--allow us to say--more than many others about the future and the national survival of our people. Because it felt the pain and struggled and underwent sacrifices many times during its historic march in order to ensure the survival.

"Those who do not recognize the Church's right to speak should not forget that if we continue today to feel--those who feel--as Greeks and continue to bear the names Khrysostomos, Nikolaos, Glavkos and Iezekias, it is because of the Church's struggle."

Finally the archbishop characterized "as nationally responsible" the way President Kyprianou dealt with the de Cuellar "guidances."

#### Support for Kyprianou

Nicosia 1 SHERRINI in Greek 27 Sep 83 p 1

[Text] Archbishop [Khrysostomos], responding to a question by 1 SHERRINI of why he now exalts Kyprianou whose policy he criticized on many occasions recently, said:

"We support policies not persons. We support the national issue and whomever, in our opinion, follows the right course on this issue. It was the right course for Kyprianou to meet with de Cuellar and ask clarifications about his memorandum. Is that wrong?"

The archbishop subsequently criticized "those who are ready to accept anything the foreigners offer" and added: "It is not right that we should offer less resistance and the Turks more. Because, he suffers greater injustice who resists less."

The archbishop claimed "that many things said by some of our political leaders and parties represent the Turkish positions."

Commenting on the reports that he has connections with Lyssaridis, Papadopoulos and Dourdas, he said that it is a long time since he has met and talked with the first two and that he does not know where the third is.

#### Khrysostomos Turnabout

Nicosia 1 SHERRINI in Greek 27 Sep 83 p 1

[Commentary] The archbishop has finally decided. President Kyprianou is an irreproachable national leader. The rest are compromisers. Until a while ago the archbishop did not speak in a complimentary way about the president whose government he considered dangerous to the country. It is not known what has transpired in the meantime for his 180-degree turn. It is more probable that our church primate is dominated by a national-apostolic zeal... We have been and still are defenders of the archbishop's right to speak on the national issue. He has the right and the obligation to have views and to

express them not only behind the scenes but from the pulpit as well. But when he expresses them he must also be ready for criticism and must listen responsibly and carefully to what he is told. Two days ago he sang in his resounding voice the praises of Kyprianou's handlings [of the Cypriot issue]. And he blasted the "compromisers."

The Church, he said, "favors Kyprianou's national stand and is against the compromising attitude which reaches the boundaries of irresponsibility. Was Makarios irresponsible when he signed the Summit Agreement with Denktash? Was Kyprianou irresponsible when he confirmed this agreement with one of his own? The used terminology is comico-tragic. The two leaders were signing [with their agreements] the partition of the island. Why did not Khrysostomos characterize them as 'compromisers' and traitors?"

It is certain that the archbishop is not well informed. No one has compromised anything. Cyprus itself yielded in 1974 and was occupied by the Turks. Since then the struggle aims at how to achieve a viable solution, and to save Cyprus. Where, then, is the "compromising" and who has adopted it? The problem lies not in what we shall give to the Turks but in what they shall give us. Because it is they who forcibly occupy our land and our rights...

The pulpit is a beautiful forum as are the beautiful, glittering chandeliers. They excite and inspire... The Church has helped this island but in several cases it could not save it, while in other cases it harmed it unwillingly. Our times are no longer times of rhetorical exaltation. They are times of grounded political reasoning. And the archbishop bears an immense responsibility when he speaks, when he analyzes his political positions and when arbitrarily he demands their acceptance...

We belong to the category of people who never stigmatized those who disagree with us as "traitors," "unpatriotic," "anti-democratic," "compromisers," etc. The political leaders and the churchmen say what they say and act the way they act according to their thinking and their gray matter. It is sad that the archbishop instead of expounding his own views has branded the thoughts of others as "compromising." An archbishop should be more collected, more modest, more unifying, a better foreman than the politicians. We are experiencing difficult times. Let him, then, try to have modest words and... a golden mouth...[Khrysostomos means he who has a "golden mouth," is a greater orator].

Two days ago the archbishop made a serious mistake. He said: "Those who do not recognize the Church's right to speak should not forget that if today we continue to feel--(those of us who feel)--as Greeks and continue to bear the names Khrysostomos and Nikolaos and Glavkos and Ezekias and not Mehmet and Hasan, it is because of the Church's national activity..." But, alas, if such distinction were correct! Church means the total of the faithful. The Church and the people cannot be separated nor the submission of all faithful could be claimed to the "national activity of the Church. Church is not composed of prelates and priests only. It consists mainly of the people! It would be more decorous if Khrysostomos extolled, albeit late, Kyprianou's national stature instead of defiling his opponents as "compromisers!"

7520

CSO: 3521/39



## WIDENING GAP BETWEEN SPD, BUNDESWEHR SEEN

Bonn RHEINISCHER MERKUR/CHRIST UND WELT in German 7 Oct 83 p 5

[Article by Horst Niggemeier, chairman of the SPD subdistrict of Recklinghausen and member of the SPD North Rhine-Westphalia Land Executive Committee: "Whoever Blockades Barracks Opens up New Rifts--The Disturbed Relationship of the SPD to the Army"]

[Text] The statements made by Johannes Rau, SPD second-in-command and minister president of North Rhine-Westphalia, at the Bonn SPD meeting on the traditional antiwar day on 1 September 1983 were quite clear. Bundeswehr Chief of Staff Wolfgang Altenburg, who was present at this meeting, will have found Rau's declaration that Social Democracy believes "in national defense, for the purpose of preventing war and ensuring democratic freedom" to be the correct description of the Bundeswehr's mission.

Dispensing with the obfuscating formulas which can be found in so many texts of security-policy motions at SPD party congresses, Johannes Rau described the Bundeswehr as "soldiers of peace," and he asked the chief of staff to "pass on a certainty to the members of the troops," namely the following:

"It would be very harmful if an increased striving for disarmament, if even the broad desire for peace among our people and the peace movement which has arisen in this connection among us as well as in other countries, happened to lead to an alienation between the Bundeswehr and the political sector, or if the feeling were to arise among the armed forces of being forced into a corner psychologically. We Social Democrats want to and will counter this possibility--precisely by insisting that a policy of peace and a desire for disarmament are inseparably linked with a defense capability and with equilibrium."

Whereas even in this highly charged phase of the debate Johannes Rau with his characteristic facility easily manages to specify concepts such as democratic freedom as the goal and military balance as the prerequisite for a policy of peace, often one seeks in vain for like formulations in the innumerable resolutions of SPD organizations.

There, mental gaps are frequently in evidence which cannot be ascribed to absentmindedness. Being practiced here is a deliberate aloofness from such concepts as were still being designated at the SPD party congresses of Berlin in 1979 and of Munich in 1982 as specific premises for a successful policy of detente.

Whoever as a democrat stands for peace and disarmament should not dispense with fundamental declarations of belief, in the nature of what the DGB [German Labor Union Federation] national executive committee did in July 1983, because these declarations bring a sense of reality into the security debate: "Democracy and trade-union rights, secure jobs, social justice, and the elimination of misery, violence, racism, and of all oppression are the best guarantees against all enemies of peace and freedom....Absolute respect for the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of all states is an essential precondition for the preservation of peace."

#### Doubt About the SPD in the Bundeswehr

Preserving the peace is not possible without the Bundeswehr and without NATO. The peace-preserving function of the Bundeswehr ("indispensable instrument of our policy for preserving the peace"--Willy Brandt, 1975) has really never been disputed by the democratic parties, and even in his farewell speech as chancellor, SPD second-in-command Helmut Schmidt said on 1 October 1982 before the parliament: "The Bundeswehr is an immensely important element in the preservation of the peace."

The top leadership of the CDU, CSU, and FDP will see this in just the same way, and certainly their membership as well. In this matter it seems that a trace of national consensus can still be sensed. But meanwhile doubts are arising in the Bundeswehr about whether large numbers of Social Democrats really still feel so definitely committed to this recognition of the peace-preserving function of the army.

Back in August, General Winfrid Vogel, a member of the SPD, heatedly complained in a letter to SPD national executive secretary Peter Glotz: "The participation of prominent SPD deputies in blockade actions against garrisons and camps of the Americans and the Bundeswehr on the questionable grounds of nonviolent demonstration is making the irritation over this painfully clear." In this case, must not the soldiers feel forced into that "psychological corner" feared by Johannes Rau? The general, who belongs to the party with a membership book whose first 27 pages are filled with the striking theses of the "Godesberg Program," criticized also "the indecent playing with the concept of resistance in the name of the SPD."

Is this criticism of any use? This will be seen in the period from 15 to 22 October. This week is the so-called "Resistance Week." The nationwide "Coordinating Committee for the Autumn Actions" established by the separate peace initiatives has stipulated 18 October as the "day of antimilitarism." On this day, actions against Bundeswehr facilities are also on the agenda.

The fact that this nationwide "Coordinating Committee for the Autumn Actions" likewise has as one of its members a peace initiative located in the Erich-Ollenhauer House having the acronym IFIAS (Initiative for

Peace, International Conciliation, and Security) under the leadership of colleague Wolfgang Biermann, who is drawing a salary from the party executive committee, is something which is not necessarily of great consequence in this special case of 18 October, even though the whole thing goes by the questionable name of "Resistance Week." Because: In the working group "Day of Antimilitarism" which was expressly formed for this 18 October, the DKP [German Communist Party] youth group called SDAJ [Socialist German Workers Youth] and the DKP-influenced organizations DFG-VK [German Peace Society-VK] and VVN [Association of Persecutees of the Nazi Regime?] have a firm grip on the planning. So it is here that avowed anti-democrats are preparing actions against the "loyal army in a democratic state" (Johannes Rau on 1 September 1983).

However, irritations such as General Vogel noted in his letter to SPD national executive secretary Glotz probably can no longer be ruled out among the soldiers. Because in all parts of the country, more than a few demonstrators who have the same party chairman as General Vogel and other soldiers will be taking part in the blockades of Bundeswehr facilities. Also not helpful here is the admonition supplied by the SPD Central Office to the local functionaries that "the organizations of the party must help to prevent any confrontation with the Bundeswehr and the allied armed forces."

#### Why No Clear Statement Against the Blockades?

Or is a blockade possibly not a confrontation? Given the semantic quibbling in the security-policy debate of the present time, this is more a topic for a doctoral thesis than a question which can be clearly answered, although it is not unworldly to stand by the formula: Whoever blockades is in confrontation. In July 1983, Doctor Glotz wrote the following for all SPD members--also for those in the Bundeswehr--which is preserved on paper for all to read: "Whoever on the basis of an individual decision of conscience breaks rules because he considers the deployment of new missiles to be disastrous must know that he himself will have to bear all the consequences."

However, for soldiers--irrespective of what their political position is--in this connection the question could arise of why then is not the watchword given clearly and unequivocally to the SPD members to avoid participating in blockades and demonstrations against military facilities, especially when the SPD executives Eppler, Lafontaine, and other prominent Social Democrats have already rejected the first occurrence of this nature? After all, the fact that anyone who violates the law has to bear the consequences himself is not in the last analysis a new realization.

But if what was said and wisely is still being said by the SPD about the "peace-preserving function of the Bundeswehr" is right, then it is hardly possible to make the members of the Bundeswehr understand why friends of peace are demonstrating against preservers of the peace. Here all plays on words fail, because there is nothing more paradoxical. (Unless in the eyes of the blockaders the Bundeswehr is not preserving the peace after all!)

Certainly it would be a good thing for the SPD if after that "Resistance Week" of 15 to 22 October it did not have to listen to talk about how portions of its membership had demonstrated at the wrong place and with the wrong means against the wrong people. That does not concern the question of nonviolence, because this is beyond dispute with the SPD leadership. It concerns the political credibility of the SPD in the Bundeswehr, as well as among the citizens, who acknowledge the peace-preserving function of the Bundeswehr.

In any case, the announcement by Peter Glotz in the September issue of the magazine for SPD members to the effect that the party will "not only accompany the peace movement with actions, but will itself mobilize" does not convey that clarity which would be necessary in this current phase of manifold actions against Pershing II's and cruise missiles (see also the "Krefeld Appeal"). In the chaos of actionism of these days, there is too much confusion here already. Who the initiator is in which place is only seldom identifiable. Unless all SPD members keep in mind that which was already explained to them by their national executive secretary in the July magazine, namely: "As a party, the SPD will not call for actions of civil disobedience even if it decides at the beginning of November against the stationing of the missiles."

It also cannot be recalled that the SPD leadership in Bonn had called for any blockades of Bundeswehr facilities. Notwithstanding, this is happening on the spot and on a large scale with the participation of Social Democrats as well. One can express his desire for peace in more appropriate ways, especially since the SPD honestly admits that it "does not have decisive influence in each case on the planning and execution of the activities of the peace movement." And the active participation of the initiative IFIAS located in the Ollenhauer House is not likely to alter things much with respect to the preparations for the "Resistance Week." Regrettably, it must be added that the SPD leadership obviously has not managed to impress on a portion of its membership that which SPD leader Willy Brandt properly announced at the SPD Peace Forum in May 1981 as its claim: "The SPD is the true political peace movement in our country." Now there are others who are making this claim, and in this connection a party so rich in tradition as the SPD is finding itself in fact to be only one group among many.

Thus what has happened in the meantime is that about which at just this "Peace Forum 81" the Social Democratic security experts around Bremen's Hans Koschnick expressly warned: "The Bundeswehr must not become a whipping boy for an inadequately explained security policy." But some people in what is called the "peace movement" have made the armed forces into precisely this. Now they are whipping boys, as is shown by the blockades and demonstrations against Bundeswehr facilities. Therefore who will blame General Vogel (SPD) when in his letter to Glotz on the peace-policy debate in his party concerning the issue of "national defense" he complains that: "Certainly there is plenty of cheap lip service given to this. But practice and the impression of public opinion are otherwise." It would certainly be unfair to simply blame national executive secretary Glotz alone for this development.



## HESSE'S GREEN PARTY DIVIDED ON ATTITUDE TOWARD SPD

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 10 Oct 83 p 5

[Article by Jochen Siemens: "The Greens and Their Political Identity. The Fight Between the 'Fundamentalists' and the 'Realpoliticians' Is Poisoning the Climate"]

[Text] "The green woodpecker," so Milan Horacek, representative of the environmentalist party in the Bundestag, describes the condition of the Hesse Greens, "the green woodpecker is no longer pecking at the rotten tree of politics. Now," and Horacek holds up a recent FR cartoon, "it has become a green carpet for the SPD--if you see that positively. If you see it negatively, it is a doormat."

Positively or negatively, something has changed among the Greens. Trenches are opened, people attack and curse one another. The cozy flair of uncomplicated, untroubled atmosphere of Green life and work, with lots of life and hope, has made way for the stuffy air of ideological and personal attacks which poisons politics on all sides. Where are they now, the regional membership meetings and political discussions, where people often argued with wearying long-windedness, but were always at pains with wall papers and in smaller circles to save consensus, where even those who had lost the point at issue went home in a feeling of communality? Is all that already green nostalgia?

Yes, it is. As ever with nostalgia, everything looks better in memory than it really was; but when the member of the Green legislative party in Wiesbaden, Jan Kuhnert (Frankfurt's city paper PFLASTERSTRAND [concrete beach] calls him "that fundamentalist who always looks like a 14th year philology student in the 5th week of a hunger strike) declares as he did recently in Frankfurt that the Greens have broken with their culture, the very context he says it in proves that it is so. "Radically ecological" and "radically democratic" members of the Greens from all organizational levels, called "fundamentalists" in the vernacular, had announced a press conference. The media had come in droves to report the internal party fight, which is not being fought openly at present.

That is not the way publicity was meant as a piece of Green culture. But the fundamentalists, whose hard core is the Frankfurt Roemer group of the Greens

centering on Manfred Zieran and Jutta Ditfurth, are presently in the minority in the state association; they fear for their Greens and for their political construction work, and want to make clear, even by way of publicity, that the state association with its decision to offer a hand to the SPD has taken the path "of killing the political identity of the Greens."

With a large majority and shouts of joy, a state members' meeting a week after the elections had decided "to offer continuous joint efforts [to the SPD] and under suitable conditions to discuss "a common vote for a minister-president": a smack in the face by the Real-politicians [practitioners of Realpolitik] to the fundamentalists--who are not admitting defeat yet, however.

The tone is getting harsher. Kuhnert, Zieran, Ditfurth, and the "fundamentalos" call this decision "voter deception." The way it came about seems to them contrary to Green rules, the majority having celebrated the defeat of the minority with "malice and spiteful glee" in "orgies of clapping." Jutta Ditfurth speaks of a "social turning point" among the Greens, and discerns a "New Right" in the party. Cynical Altsponsis people "who have given up hope of basic change" are spreading feelings of resignation, she says. The "bearers of hope" of the outsiders, the downtrodden, "weaken the people's will," and "then I call that the New Right. Those are the people who project their failure in their own two-bit projects [onto the whole] and betray the new movement." That is certainly clear speaking, and before they take apart the decision of the practitioners of Realpolitik, Zieran slips in a theoretical underpinning to show why the path of the realists is false.

Two rapidly sketched curves are to show the paths and prospects of the Greens. The one goes up steeply shortly after the zero point, stays up a little, and then disappears, irresistably declining [back] toward zero, into the vastnesses of the coordinate system. The other sticks at first close to the zero line, but the longer the factor of time lasts, the more relentlessly it rises into the heights that mark success. This is the one supposed to describe the path of the fundamentalists. Stony to be sure, a period of straitened circumstances which has to be overcome at first, so one can read the graph, but at last successful, because "you don't drown in the machinery," because the feedback to the basis is always preserved, without forgetting that the Greens are no "parliamentary party" but an "action party."

"Only social pressure gives us the possibility of change," says Zieran. Karl Kerschgens, who stands for willingness to negotiate with the SPD, may assume the central questions of our society can be decided in Parliament, "but I don't believe that," adds Zieran. The power constellations in the system are otherwise: only outside of Parliament does political pressure arise--the counterculture. Only if the political spearhead seeks its backing there, lives in this structure, does it have a chance not to be ground down in the parliamentary works, like the former idealists in the SPD.

Over the years, when the protest potential in society has grown, and the Greens control 15 percent or more of Parliament, then, yes then one can let

oneself in for dealings with the other parties, without succumbing to the obvious danger of being "used." But all right, so the fundamentalists go on judging mercilessly, even if we take a look at the Realpolitik which is supposed to be being pursued in Wiesbaden, it is just plain worse than sad. You cannot "throw yourselves into the SPD's belly" as an election loser a week after the election, as was decided at Marbach. The intention to help pass the state budget for 1983, if the disposable 100 million DM are applied ecologically sensible (total budget volume a bare 20 billion), is simple "voter deception" [fraud]. For that would free funds for police, execution of sentences, and highway construction against which Greens on the community level have worked and protested for years. And the biggest meatball, the evil per se, so to speak: In the Kerschgens paper that was passed, the term Startbahn West [Runway West, Frankfurt/Main, site of massive protests and long a bone of contention] no longer even appears. That symbol of Green growth and the inhuman system! All that enrages the fundamentalists, and now has to be resisted, if one wants to remind the party of its virtues and its principles.

For one thing seems clear. What happened in Marbach was no accident, no "situational majority." No, what has just ended among the Hesse Greens with an offer of cooperation to the SPD under definite conditions was predictable. Already at the beginning of this year the realists had the majority of a state convention in Kassel when it was a matter of approving the partial budget which had been agreed on with the SPD. And that although the Wiesbaden neo-parliamentarians had to listen to taunts that the SPD had pulled the wool over their eyes and that they had overlooked sums of millions that are planned for highways and other projects that make Green hackles rise.

Nevertheless, there was agreement, and the bases majority for Green policies, which seek to exploit "Hessian conditions" realistically, continues to exist. The state legislature group was personally confirmed before the election, although already in summer it was predictable that the Realpolitiker would have the upper hand in the parliamentary group. More and more concrete results of the new parliamentary work became visible. Individual programs on energy policy, air purity, and traffic policy were introduced and are available now as instruments of realizable policy. In negotiations with the SPD one would no longer need to recite cloudy formulations of Green articles of faith.

The realistic trend has also become ever clearer in the legislature group personally. Fragmentation seems overcome, and today 12 of the 15 members stand unequivocally behind the Marbach decision.

Thus in spite of the Frankfurt monkey wrench it is getting harder for the SPD to argue Green "unreliability" and "unpredictability" in order to avoid programmatic compromises. Not least because there is a majority left of the center. The SPD gained in the elections while the Greens lost, probably shrinking back to their real potential, which one will have to reckon with in the politics of the next few years. At the South Hesse convention of the SPD on the weekend something of this recognition shone through. Rudi Arndt, of all people, praised the clarification process among the Greens,



called the discussion between fundamentalists and realists natural and necessary, saying that the SPD after all had gone through a similar "clarification process." How this turns out will depend not least on the further actions of the SPD. The South Hessians--so it appears--have already put one foot onto the green carpet.

12428

CSO: 3620/25

## RETIRING SECRETARY OF FINLAND-USSR FRIENDSHIP SOCIETY COMMENTS

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 14 Oct 83 p 22

[Article by Kaa Eneberg]

[Text] Helsinki, October--"We work actively for friendship, understanding, and increased contact with the Soviet Union on all levels--cultural, economic, and political. We also see it as our task to call the government's and Parliament's attention to trends in Finnish society which work against the policy of friendship."

So says Christina Porkkala, 64, retiring secretary general of the Finland-USSR Friendship Society, which has its headquarters in Helsinki and 600 sections scattered all over the country.

The society plays a central role in the friendship policy and is represented in most official connections. It also takes on commitments that would otherwise be shouldered by the government--the most recent example being the 35th anniversary of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union.

The society is regarded as a purely communist organization by ordinary people, but in fact, it has members and elected directors from all the parties. It is an unstated rule, however, that the secretary general must be a Communist. That rule was loudly criticized in Social Democratic quarters during the election of Porkkala's successor.

#### Key to Good Business

The society is organized technically as a political party and holds a congress complete with delegates every 4 years. Its central board includes Martti Miettunen (Center Party), who was a minister for many years, and Matti Kekkonen, a justice of the Supreme Administrative Court and Urho Kekkonen's son, who has been a driving force in the society. The board also includes several leading Social Democrats.

The society takes in nearly 5 million marks over its national budget. Dues-paying members number 120,000, but the membership can also be numbered "in the millions."

This is because of "collective membership" on the part of such organizations as the Association of Local Governments and the Central Federation of Finnish Trade Unions and such firms as Finnair, the airline company, in which the government holds a majority interest. Christina Porkkala looked at her papers with some surprise:

"This seems to be the first time that we have not had someone from the government on our central board," she said. She added that most members of the government and of Parliament are also members of the society. It is regarded as shrewd to be a member, since membership can be the key to good business deals.

But it has not always been a shrewd idea to work on behalf of friendship with the big neighbor. It was not popular when Christina Porkkala herself joined the peace movement in the 1930's as a teenager. She herself comes from a solid nonsocialist Finland-Swedish environment in Helsinki.

Her family had immigrated from Riga, and Christina Porkkala emphasizes the international outlook on life. There was a reaction in her family against the supranational tendencies and romanticizing of war in Finland. Her father, who was an agronomist, always protested against the historical inaccuracies of the hatred of Russia that was being stirred up. Finland had good relations with its eastern neighbor even when it was a grand duchy. Christina Porkkala points out that her father never fought in the civil war, although there was a "White" general in the family.

She married into the Porkkala name--an emotionally charged name in Finland--in 1950, a few years after the Porkkala area near Helsinki was annexed--or, as the current expression has it, leased. The name change was regarded by many as a demonstration of solidarity.

For 13 years, Christina Porkkala has headed the society in Helsinki with the powerful Metalworkers Union and the Social Democratic Party as neighbors. She was involved in establishing the first Swedish-speaking section in Helsinki in 1945, not long after the society was founded (in October of the preceding year, barely a month after the cessation of hostilities). Driving forces were J. K. Paasikivi, Urho Kekkonen, and, on the Swedish-speaking side, party leader Ralf Torngren, for many years a minister, and others.

Christina Porkkala is displeased at the fact that the society's role and the commitment of those in power are not always reflected in the press.

"An institution like ours, in which leading politicians from all the parties reach important decisions in full agreement, is something absolutely unique."

A current problem for the society is the halting trade balance with the Soviet Union. Finland imports too little to offset its exports. Trade is purely an exchange of goods. Minister of Foreign Trade Jermu Laine (Social Democrat) is deputy chairman of the society's special group on trade policy. The group's job is to see that the framework for trade is created and to provide information on how imports from the Soviet Union can be increased. The most burning issue at present is Soviet natural gas. The society is critical of the fact

that imports have not yet started in earnest. The matter has already been discussed for a long time and ought to be ripe for a decision.

Porkkala feels that the approach to cooperation is too one-sided on the Finnish side. Finland cannot simply keep on demanding that it be allowed to build the port in Tallinn and other profitable projects without doing something in return.

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## SORSA, OTHER SDP LEADERS TELL WISHES FOR NEW PARTY PROGRAM

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 28 Aug 83 p 7

[Article by Erkki Pennanen: "Kalevi Sorsa on SDP Platform: SDP Must Change Its Course"]

[Text] Forssa—Many of the Social Democrats' traditional ideas on what actions to engage in are being seriously questioned in this changing world and that is also forcing them to make a thorough reappraisal of their policies. Thus SDP [Social Democratic Party] chairman Kalevi Sorsa self-critically provided the impetus for his party's discussion of its new platform.

Thousands of Social Democrats from all over Finland met at the end of this week in Forssa to celebrate the 80th anniversary of the party's first program and to discuss the new challenges for the party.

The platform approved in Forssa in 1903 was not replaced by a new platform, which is still in effect, until 1952. They intend to draft an entirely new platform for approval at the 1987 party congress.

The SDP's changed position in Finnish society is well reflected in the fact that this time the chief site for the Forssa congress was no longer a workers hall but a fine municipal building in the conference room of which a party seminar on political ideology was organized.

The discussion of relations between the party and the trade union movement that was organized in the sports hall really interested the people who had come to Forssa much more. At its peak attendance 800 people participated in it.

In reporting on the drafting of the new platform, chairman Sorsa said that the Social Democrats have also gotten overly attached to ideas about how to act that are being seriously questioned.

## Sacred Cows Challenged

As examples of such questionable ideas, he cited confidence solely in the affirmation of economic growth and technology. According to Sorsa, they have also overconfidently believed that an increase in the government's role automatically solves problems. He also criticized the tendency to equate state power with people's power.



Sorsa felt that the requirements of the natural economy and the growth policy were forcing them to engage in entirely new kinds of development programs and assessments of the future. While economic growth and a traditional policy of prosperity should not be regarded as dirty words, as some have begun to do, the focus must be shifted from what it has been to a newer kind of policy, "a quality-of-life policy."

Sorsa also took a stand on the debate over socialism. He felt that social democracy must shorten sail as regards its conception of socialism, clearly in the direction of self-government and direct influence. He is ready to go ahead and do this despite the fact that not all problems are solved by choosing some policy or other, as he put it.

According to Sorsa, the Social Democrats also need to be more specific about their conception of a planned economy: "We must repudiate the notion that systematic planning can only be accomplished through centralization. Planning must be capable of reacting to restoration and of being flexible. We can also build a planned economy taking advantage of limited planning and market forces."

Speaking of nationalization, Sorsa said that a company is not necessarily any better because it is a state enterprise. All things considered, there are many sides to the question. "Nationalization would not seem to be the right approach for firms operating purely on their own," he said.

Sorsa was ready to ask whether the SDP was too deeply rooted in the mold of representative democracy, in the firm belief in parliamentary procedures. We must develop a citizens' democracy along with it, one of civic action in many forms.

Sorsa felt that one way of developing self-governing socialism would be "the path of wage-earner or united action funds." He said that what he specifically meant was company funds, thus drawing a clear distinction between it and the Swedish Social Democratic fund model, which is based on collectivist and regional funds.

#### Joint Declaration by SDP and Trade Union Movement

The joint SDP-trade union movement resolution issued in connection with the trade union policy seminar held Saturday clearly indicated that united action funds are not, however, included among the party and the trade union movement's most urgent demands.

An economic and wage policy aimed at combatting inflation and improving employment, improvement of job security and gradual shortening of the work week were specified as the most important demands of the SDP and the trade union movement.

SDP party secretary Erkki Liikanen felt that one important key question was whether the trade union movement is capable of demonstrating its solidarity with its own unemployed comrades, that is, of exercising moderation in its wage demands.

As for SAK [Central Federation of Finnish Trade Unions] chairman Pertti Viinanen, he was ready to answer that question affirmatively. He also stressed the fact that the SAK will in future as well be an independent organization with respect to employers, state power and the parties — including the worker parties.

Viinanen hoped that in the future too people would say of the SDP's image and political content that it was a question of its being a worker party, not on any account a government caretaker and general party.

In the joint SDP-trade union movement resolution the Social Democrats also extend their support to future efforts to first of all obtain wage agreements containing concentrated, solidary and reasonable reforms.

This time an AKAVA [Academic Professional Commission] representative participated in the Social Democrats' trade union policy seminar.

Scheduled for Sunday is the main event per se with an accompanying march in celebration of the 80th anniversary of the Forssa platform. As a sequel to this, the summer meeting of the party's parliamentary delegation will begin at the same location.

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## SOCIALIST PARTY BEGINS WORK TO REVISE 80-YEAR-OLD PROGRAM

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 28 Aug 83 p 25

[Article by Erkki Pennanen: "Things Are Moving Fast with the Social Democrats"]

[Text] Finland's Social Democratic Party (SDP) came into being 80 years ago in Forssa. Now the SDP has assembled in the same place to undergo a considerable transformation. A radical worker movement has begotten a government caretaker party that governs Finland.

Born as the Finnish Workers Party in Forssa in 1903, the SDP has undergone a considerable transformation in 80 years time. Historians can outline the changes in Finnish society by drawing a curve from the days of the Forssa congress to the election of Mauno Koivisto as president of the republic via the Civil War, the Winter War and postwar national integration.

The SDP transformation curve can also be drawn as a much shorter and more dramatic one: One starting point for the evolutionary curve can be shifted to just the mid-1960's. The liberation of foreign policy from the burden of Tanner's policies, the 1966 election victory and submission to Urho Kekkonen's control made possible the Social Democrats' rise to power and the ousting of the Center Party as a government caretaker party when the Kekkonen era came to an end.

In the Conservative Party they have already begun to talk of a Social Democratic hegemony that is a threat to the society. While the other parties say that the danger is grossly exaggerated, all unanimously agree that things are now moving fast with the Social Democrats.

As a sequel to its historic victory in the presidential elections, the SDP captured 57 seats in the parliamentary elections of spring 1983, or more than it ever has since the wars. Its long responsibility within the government has not imposed a burden on votes for the party. Having for a long time gained momentum outside the government, the Conservative Party was surprisingly left without an expected election victory.

The Conservative Party, the Center Party and the Communists each have their own internal difficulties and leadership problems. Unity and lack of internal grumbling in the ranks of the Social Democrats are all the more pronounced.

## Kalevi Sorsa's Twin Powers

Kalevi Sorsa has been chairman of the SDP since 1975 and will remain so for as long as he wants -- that is, at least until 1987 when the party should acquire a new platform after a 25-year interval.

Since Sorsa's predecessor, Rafael Paasio, had for some time taken care of the duties of both the chairman and the prime minister, the party council decided that it was not proper for the same man to occupy both important posts. Paasio relinquished his duties as prime minister. They got Mauno Koivisto.

Koivisto was also prime minister during Sorsa's chairmanship between 1979 and 1982, which at times created awkward situations for the party. When Koivisto moved into the presidential palace, the chairman and prime minister's duties reverted to one and the same man and there has been no public grumbling about the fact. In a recent interview published by the magazine APU, Sorsa elegantly justified his double role: "It's better for one man to bear the weight of the cross than for a controversy [literally 'cross-dispute'] to arise between two men."

Sorsa is right now the country's mightiest politician and the monarch of domestic policy -- Koivisto tries to remain on the sidelines of day-to-day politics. Sorsa is valued more and more -- unlike during his first term as prime minister in the early 1970's -- outside his own party as well.

Sorsa has radically changed since the early 1970's. His own acknowledgment in the APU interview reflects that change well: "The young guard campaigned to get us into the SDP leadership in the 1970's. We were inexperienced. We had no experience with all those forces that are influential in a society.... So we stumbled about foolishly, I along with the others, maybe even at their head."

At least nonsocialists at first regarded Sorsa as being rather Left-leaning.

An attraction to ideological visions and deliberations is still a natural thing for party leader Sorsa, even if it is difficult to regard him as being very leftist. But Prime Minister Sorsa has his feet so firmly planted on the ground that not even in the Finnish Employers Association (STK) would they be capable of finding a more suitable prime minister for the country.

Sorsa emphatically appears in public as the prime minister, rarely as the chairman of the SDP. He is not afraid to talk about the importance of the economy's ability to compete internationally as a condition of future survival. That is why he preaches the importance of a disciplined economic policy line and a moderate wage policy to Social Democrats and trade union leaders as well.

Sorsa immediately hastened to label the Conservative Party's attempts to toughen the political language of the opposition as irresponsible street urchin language. He expressed his concern over the lowering of the level of political debate. The Social Democrats have assumed the role of bearer of responsibility in this society, a role whose peaceful development the SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League] and the Conservative Party are now presumably threatening.

The consensus or mutual understanding policy promoted by Sorsa and before him by Koivisto has been so obediently and rather peacefully adopted in the party that it has been pointless to look for signs of open struggle. Not even the breaking off of the government coalition with the SKP, as before the elections led to very overt complaints or discussion as to the effects it would produce.

The sharp division within the party 10 years back into supporters and opponents of the EEC agreement is in like manner a time that has been left far behind them.

"If we have opted for a policy of open economy and internationalization, it follows that certain things have to be accepted," Member of Parliament Paavo Lipponen, Koivisto's political secretary during his term as prime minister, justified the current economic policy line.

The key to the situation is, therefore, the ability to compete internationally, and no country is any longer capable of pursuing its own independent recovery policy, independently of other countries.

"To be sure, not everyone yet admits this, still dreaming instead of a closed economy," Lipponen marveled.

Seppo Lindblom, who transferred from the Bank of Finland to become the Sorsa administrations' commerce and industry minister, swears so resolutely by a tight economic policy that, in his opinion, "it is better to risk even mutual political understanding among the government parties than the nation's economic interest."

Koivisto's low profile as president has undoubtedly encouraged the Social Democrats to determinedly invest in the current policy, a position that is otherwise naturally incumbent on a party that has assumed the role of government caretaker. Koivisto has asserted that people do not expect big promises from politicians — if they later prove to be unfulfilled.

The SKDL's internal split and its weakness have eased the Social Democrats' choice of a policy. They do not now have to fear a loss of votes to the Left. It would be tempting to court those nonsocialists who voted for Koivisto as president. However, they have decided to make it clear that there can be no question of a government coalition with the Conservative Party.

SKP [Finnish Communist Party] chairman Jouko Kajanoja describes the SDP's political development in Marxist terms: "The SDP has more and more become a party in power pursuing a bourgeois policy, a party that has at the same time increased the distance between its positions and those of a worker party, a party of the Left."

In vain can we look for the aggressive sympathy with the Left of bygone years among SDP ministers and members of Parliament. Who can still remember that Education Minister Kaarina Suonio was once referred to as her party's Rosa Luxemburg? As social affairs and health minister, however, Vappu Taipale,



known to be a pacifist activist, still wages war on military playthings. People say that former EKO opponent Pirkko Tyolajarvi may even have the makings of the party's candidate for prime minister. But as a person she just does not happen to be on the same wavelength as Sorsa.

Encounters with brother-in-arms socialists, "master socialists" and palkanelainens seem to be historically remote. In the early 1970's there was an exceptionally radical change of generations in the party. Many of the radicals involved in high school and university politics in the late 1960's took over the party's leading posts and marched into Parliament. Now — a good decade later — it is alarming to note that only a few of them are any longer involved in current politics.

Party secretary Erkki Liikanen, 32, is one of the Social Democrats who has been in Parliament longest: Only Sakari Knuuttila has been there since before 1970.

A former university student radical and party secretary, Ulf Sundqvist subjugated the industrial barons as minister of industry and now gazes at politics from his seat as director of the Tyovaen Saastopankki [Workers Savings Bank]. In interviews he does not see any need for the radicalism he represented in his youth in today's society.

Long since frustrated with his role as a parliamentary representative, dissident Erkki Tuomioja occupies the post of Helsinki assistant municipal director. He is disappointed with politics. If he were now starting his political career, he would scarcely join any party.

Both of them have changed, but times have changed too. Now, in the early 1980's, politics is not bringing young people to the barricades. Young people do not find channels for their energy in today's party machines. In past years radical initiatives of SDP youth organizations deviating too much from the party line received the official crushing criticism of the party leaders. Now any improprieties by the youth organizations are simply passed over in unconcerned silence. Many indeed feel attracted to the more active policy of the alternative movements.

#### Beginning of the End of an Idyll

Party secretary Erkki Liikanen characterized the present situation optimistically: "After a long run through the rapids, the party has entered a quiet water phase — an exceptional idyll in the history of the party."

It is now over a decade since the deep-seated disputes that tested the unity of the SDP and the trade union movement were finally settled. Those disputes taught them that quarrels should not be brought out into the open before there are really strong pressures to do so.

Such pressures may come suddenly, when a party's luck at the polls fails. In comparison with the other Nordic countries the SDP is indeed still a long way from the maximal limit of its support base, a limit which prolongation of the Communist split may extend even further.

The idyll may, on the other hand, come to an end even before an election defeat if Sorsa's present mutual understanding line fails and the government coalition founders.

In an article of his published in July in HELSINGIN SANOMAT, copying Pekka Kuusi, Sorsa admitted that "in this period of great calm political machines are liable to appear to be the embodiment of inactivity."

The problem is more serious for the Social Democrats than for the nonsocialist parties. The most glowing expression of the prosperity and wage distribution policy the Social Democrats were developing for economic growth was Pekka Kuusi's work, "Social Policy in the 1960's," which appeared over 20 years ago and which immediately became a handbook of social policy.

Now the golden age of Social Democratic optimism over reform seems to be undeniably coming to an end. Scanty economic growth does not even leave room for the implementation of the later phases of the reforms that have been initiated, to say nothing of launching new ones. The high rate of unemployment, the tax burden and inflation are permanent problems. An ever growing group of pensioners are sharing the cake produced by the working population.

#### Soft Alternatives

Will then the Social Democrats' former objectives and utopias have to be abandoned? What can be found to replace them?

The SDP does not have clearcut answers to these questions. As many other SDP leaders have, Kalevi Sorsa too admitted: "We have carried out a great social reform program and we don't know exactly what we should do now."

Among other areas, an answer has been sought by laying emphasis on "soft" values. Environmental issues, opposition to nuclear power and even disparagement of the new technology have gained a foothold among young people and especially women.

As for a faction that has gained much broader support, it cautions us as to "pessimism with regard to growth." It emphasizes the fact that in our present state of well-being even slight economic growth still affords room to maneuver in promoting traditional Social Democratic objectives — of course, the order of importance of these objectives must be more carefully weighed than before.

Party leader Sorsa is trying to reconcile the differing factions. In his opinion, issues affecting the quality of life are still more important.

For most party members the usual problems are still much more real and of vital current interest than the soft issues. "We cannot view the world only in terms of green values; rather our point of departure must be the defense and further development of our prosperity policy achievements," SDP planning secretary Pentti Puoskari said. He bears the chief responsibility for the preparation of the future platform.

## Socialism's Utopias

The 1903 Forssa program managed to serve the Social Democrats as a platform for 5 decades. The 1952 platform is today still in effect. The secret of its durability is a very abstract ideological program language.

They intend to get the new platform ready in time for the 1987 party congress. The preliminary work done in the primary organizations has revealed that members want to have more commonplace and practical issues included in the platform instead of an exalted ideological level.

"Social democracy cannot be built on the basis of any ultimate utopias; rather every generation has to have its own utopia," Puoskari summarized the conclusion they have reached at this point.

Socialism is a positive dream of the future for less and less SDP voters. For many reasons, however, entirely omitting socialism from the platform is impossible. The only alternative is to make it clear that for the Social Democrats socialism does not mean the traditional "ultimate goal," but an on-going reform movement: understanding the concept of socialism in that in-offensive "Bernstein-like" sense, Bernstein, whose name Koivisto too dared to acknowledge during the presidential election campaign.

The situation with respect to nationalization is even more troublesome. According to the 1952 platform, the branches of trade and industry and firms are to be transferred to the domain of public ownership and control "to the extent it is expedient...."

For most of the party's voters nationalization is nowadays a red flag. Thus demands for nationalization are labeled "very traditional and rigid." They realize that a society that is too powerful can itself become a threat to private individuals and democracy.

With the transformation of the society the SDP has already come a long way in evolving from a class-based workers' party to a common citizens' party composed of wage-earners and consumers. Its traditional supporters, however, feel that there is a danger of the SDP's changing into a completely odorless and colorless general party for which the most important thing is just to assure the permanence of its dominant position.

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## STALINIST NEWSPAPER CLAIMS 'DISTORTION' OF KEKKONEN RECORD

Helsinki TIEDONANTAJA in Finnish 25 Aug 83 p 5

[Article by Seppo Iisalo: "Professor Hemanus: Discussion of Kekkonen Era Distorted"]

[Text] "Forgetting Urho Kekkonen and above all his great achievements in the domain of foreign policy is one of the things that is fashionable today which I will under no circumstances be carried away with."

This is what Prof Pertti Hemanus, who has charged the press with distorting discussion of the topic, said.

In a speech published in ILTA-SANOMAT Professor Hemanus alluded to claims to the effect that Kekkonen stifled free discussion.

"But he did, after all, serve as president from 1956 to 1981, during precisely those decades when discussion in this country opened channels freer than before and billowed forth foaming."

Hemanus asked in what way the atmosphere in Finland may have been cleared in the fall of 1981 or early spring of 1982 and answered: "I didn't notice any such change."

Irritated over the liberated discussion issue, Hemanus regretted that the values of fairness and objectivity were being trampled underfoot. "Those values oblige us to compare Urho Kekkonen and Mauno Koivisto, for example, on different bases than are usually employed," he writes.

"Bottom of the Basket Has Just Begun to Be Filled"

"In Kekkonen, namely in his person, we had our most effective, international-level statesman, perhaps the number-one statesman Finland has so far produced. Kekkonen was great in spite of or with his weaknesses.

"And what about Koivisto? Sympathetic, matter-of-fact, very popular; I answer my foreign friends who ask about him. In comparison with the mature Kekkonen's achievements, his record of foreign and domestic policy achievements is still modest; the bottom of the basket has perhaps just begun to be filled," Hemanus writes polemically.

Professor Hemanus said that he longed for "Kekkonen, the visionary, a statesman whose perspectives went far beyond the narrow limits set by some current political situation. That Kekkonen dared to make unpopular decisions, which were only afterwards generally admitted to be the right ones." He asked whether Koivisto dared to do the same.

#### "Ingratitude Is the World's Reward"

"Koivisto did not have to relieve Ahti Karjalainen of his official duties as abruptly as he did. Koivisto did not have to follow the wishes of leading politicians either. Koivisto could have postponed the matter — he knows how to do that — waited for a better moment, avoided the stench of the worst kind of scandal. That would have been elegant.

"I am not the only citizen of this republic who suspects that Karjalainen's so-called personal problem was found as a made-up reason, aside from any other one, to get rid of him. Once again a deserving man of the Kekkonen era was fired. Ingratitude is the world's reward," Hemanus concluded his speech.

#### Eskola Began the Discussion

A couple of months ago Prof Antti Eskola discussed the same topic Hemanus did in ILTA-SANOMAT during an UUSI SUOMI interview.

Eskola felt that the way in which Ahti Karjalainen was ousted was an exceptionally ugly one for Finland. "Hardly anyone has been so unpleasantly shoved aside before," he said.

"What does this really mean and how far will the avalanche go? I fear that it won't stop at this, but that similar processes are beginning to occur in several areas," Eskola said.

"I would say that at some time in the future, when this episode is judged, Koivisto will be the target of criticism," Eskola replied.

#### Kekkonen Mudslingers Have Foreign Policy Aims

The discussion that is passing judgment on Urho Kekkonen's achievements as a statesman, which Prof Pertti Hemanus has described as distorted, began immediately after Kekkonen resigned in the fall of 1981.

The first appraisals centered on consideration of the symptoms of his illness, but very soon shifted from medical to political considerations. In the course of the discussion they began to more or less directly intimate that Kekkonen had already for a long time been a mentally ill man whose actions — not forgetting his foreign policy actions — would not stand up to critical scrutiny.

When it became clear that Kekkonen would remain in permanent retirement at Tamminiemi, the discussion over the "liberation of discussion" began. This rapidly sent out runners and also produced a new foreign policy finger exercise.



It was, among other things, claimed that during the Koivisto era Finland would no longer promote a nuclear-free Nordic zone as emphatically as before.

Free discussion climaxed in Dag Anckari's proposal that Finland disengage itself from the Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Pact. After that the Western press systematically began to talk of a Finland with a liberated atmosphere that had cut the umbilical cord with the second republic of Kekkonen.

The notion of a third republic, by which was meant a post-Kekkonen Finland, had already arisen before that. It was introduced by Max Jakobson, the general director of the Commerce and Industry Commission.

According to him, relegating harmonious relations with our neighbor (read: relations with the East) to the back burner and replacing them with internationalization, or concentrating on relations with the West, are the proper ways of pursuing a third republic foreign policy.

Besides fretting about Kekkonen as a person all the time, they have tested the soil in order to nibble away at Kekkonen's foreign policy, even though President Koivisto has repeatedly said that he will continue to pursue the legacy of his predecessor.

Last May the most evident manifestation so far of Finland's transformation into the third republic was displayed at UUSI SUOMI.

UUSI SUOMI had assembled the foreign policy club, headed by Max Jakobson and Jaakko Itoniemi (Social Democrat). The club loudly declared that the Paasikivi-Kekkonen foreign policy line has "dropped out of general use and no one has even noticed it." "Of course, it was primarily the Soviets who stopped using that line," the UUSI SUOMI discussants claimed.

Their joy was premature. In connection with President Koivisto's visit to the Soviet Union, it was on many occasions emphasized that the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line would be continued. Koivisto said so and his Soviet hosts, who stressed the fact that they held the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line in great esteem, said so.

Reading the communique issued on the occasion of the state visit was for that reason like eating crow for Jakobson and his pals, but not even that seems to have discouraged these men.

In the latest issue of DAGENS NYHETER last Saturday K.A. Fagerholm and Jaakko Itoniemi discussed Kekkonen in a way that is indicative of perseverance in laying the foundation for a change in foreign policy. Among other things, Itoniemi repeated the idea he had advanced in May to the effect that Kekkonen's foreign policy system no longer exists and that the Soviet Union may adapt to the new realities.

"Now Finland is again governed through institutions, not a clique of select people who enjoy the president's favor," Itoniemi asserted in DAGENS NYHETER. According to him, it is, nevertheless, too early to say into what the political process will change in Finland during Koivisto's time in office.

"But Koivisto clearly represents a different political philosophy and belongs to a different school," Iloniemi said during the interview.

In the UUSI SUOMI foreign policy club Jakobson expressed the same idea by anticipating that we will be returning to the so-called legal kind of foreign policy thinking that preceded the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line.

11,466

CSO: 3617/177

## ND WINS INTERNAL ELECTIONS IN MAJOR PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 14 Oct 83 p 1

/Text/ The Democratic Union of the Working People /DEE/ (ND) at the Public Power Corporation /DEI/ won the election for representatives of the working people to the DEI Advisory Committee. The election results were announced last night.

Of the 10,000 counted votes, DEE (ND) received 4,206 votes (42.5%), the United Front (PASOK) 3,903 votes (39%), the Revolutionary Communist Association (KKE) 1,431 votes (14.4%) and the Restorative Array 304 votes (3%).

At the National Economy Ministry Too

In the elections of the National Economy Ministry Employees Union (private law), the Democratic Movement /DIKI/ Union affiliated with ND won for the first time with 136 votes (60.45%). The Panhellenic Militant Workers Trade Union (PASOK) and the United Anti-dictatorial Labor Movement-Cooperating (KKE) received 84 votes (37.33%) while the independents received 5 votes (2.22%). A total of 225 persons voted.

At the Bank of Greece

In the elections for representatives to the Bank of Greece Advisory Council, DIKI received 658 votes (23.5%) even though it participated in such elections for the first time. DISN /expansion unknown/ (PASOK) received 556 votes (16.5%)--it lost, that is, one third of its strength compared to the previous elections.

ASPE /expansion unknown/ led by Khar. Papamargaris came first with 700 votes while the United Front (KKE) won 468 votes (14.6%).

7520

CSO: 3521/37

## REEMERGING 'MACEDONIAN QUESTION' DISCUSSED

Athens TO VIMA TIS KYRIAKIS in Greek 9 Oct 83 p 8

/Article by Giannis Kartalis: "The Macedonian Question and Relations with Yugoslavia"/

/Text/ On the eve of the official visit of Yugoslav Premier Madame Milka Planinc, the familiar old story of the so-called "Macedonian Question" resurfaced again following certain statements of K. Tsolakis, member of the KKE Politbureau. The statements gave the opportunity to the rightist newspapers to make a lot of noise over this sensitive problem.

The fact caused Minister of Interior G. Gennimatas to make a statement (in which he condemns, in effect, both Tsolakis' statements and the commotion caused by the rightist newspapers) speaking about the "unfortunate attempt to rekindle an issue which Greece considers nonexistent" and whose overemphasis "by any side badly serves our national cause when it does not serve strange purposes."

But what did Tsolakis say in effect? Speaking in Giannina on the repatriation problems of political refugees, he said: "There is still a part /of political refugees/ numbering some 20,000 who are still abroad. Unfortunately even under the present government there are problems which make their repatriation difficult. We have comrades who live abroad and who apply for a passport, but when /the authorities/ find that they belong to a certain minority which lives in Greece they deny them the possibility of repatriation."

It is clear, therefore, that Tsolakis made indirect reference to the existence of a "Macedonian" minority in Greece. It is also a fact, that RIZOSPASTIS published the complete text of his speech. Two days later the KKE Press Office in a press release underlined that some gave "suspicious interpretations to one section of a speech by a leading member of the party" and that presumably "KKE reopens the Macedonian problem." At the same time, authoritative KKE circles gave assurances to the press that "for us there is no Macedonian problem because not only has it been solved by history but it is also obsolete."

Then why did Tsolakis say what he did? Evidently because he wanted to bring about the return of the largest number of political refugees and not reopen

an issue which does not exist for Greece or Yugoslavia. (It is known that on the "Macedonian" question the Greek and Bulgarian views are for the time being virtually identical.)

It is also known that the present Greek government has stated that those "of Greek origin" are entitled to return to Greece, thereby excluding those who have a passport of a so-called "Macedonian nationality."

Today it is logically impossible to claim that there is a "Macedonian" minority. Of course one cannot dispute that in the past there were individuals with Slavic consciousness who called themselves sometimes Bulgarians and sometimes Slavomacedonians. Following the occupation and the end of the civil war those individuals fled mostly to Yugoslavia. There, under the familiar conditions, they underwent "reeducation" and were to a large extent assimilated into their natural Slavic environment. Those few bi-linguals who remained in Greece actively proved their Greek consciousness, participating in the country's economic, social and cultural life. The policy of the government in Skopja is to deliberately distort the historical facts in order to impose the view that the Macedonians are not Greek but constitute a separate nationality.

Belgrade for its part has raised periodically the question of recognizing a "Macedonian minority" (mainly through Skopja) and has asked for the granting of minority rights, but without exercising too much pressure in that direction. When in May 1982 Premier A. Papandreu paid an official visit to Belgrade, the Yugoslav leadership tried to avoid raising the "Macedonian issue." There was only an indirect reference by Madame Planinc when she spoke at the formal dinner and mentioned "the national minorities who are many in the Balkans" and which "should be a strong bridge of confidence and not an apple of discord."

From the Greek side there was a significant gesture of good will when for the first time after the war the Greek ambassador to Belgrade paid (approximately a year ago) a courtesy visit to Skopja. This visit came to seal the climate of detente which had begun to prevail on the "Macedonian issue."

Since then this climate has been disrupted often. The problem caused by the Greek students at the Skopja University angered the Yugoslavs, it appears, with the matter culminating in an unacceptable commentary in the official organ KOMUNIST of the League of Yugoslav Communists in which the Greek government was accused to "nationalistic, chauvinistic and by extension anti-Macedonian and anti-Yugoslav motives."

But what particularly disturbs Athens is that Belgrade often follows the tactics of Skopja. Thus on 2 August, Yugoslav President Spiljak in a speech said: "We develop relations of cooperation in many sectors with Bulgaria and Greece, but the refusal to recognize the Macedonian ethnic minority in their countries makes cooperation difficult, although it could be even more fraternal and rich."



The last episode in this "serial" of the Macedonian issue" was the problem caused in the Balkan Book Exhibition when the Yugoslavs threatened to withdraw unless the Albanians removed the strongly anti-Yugoslav book of Emver Hotza "Titoists," from their pavilion. In the end the Albanians chose to close their pavilion.

This ever-changing climate between detente and tension on the "Macedonian issue" does not seem to affect seriously the traditionally good Greek-Yugoslav relations. This was shown once again during last week's visit to Athens of Yugoslavia's Deputy Foreign Minister Svete who came to prepare the visit of Madame Planinc who is coming on 20 October to return Papandreou's visit to Belgrade in May 1982.

As announced after the talks between Svete and Papoulias, "they verified the continuing positive progress in the bilateral relations and an agreement of views on the question of "nuclear-free zone in the Balkans." This, of course, does not mean that there are no problems in Greek-Yugoslav relations, such as the question of abolishing passport visas, the transit of trucks, the free trade in the border areas, etc.

7520

CSO: 3521/37

## ANALYSIS OF FACTIONAL LINE UP IN ND INTERNAL CRISIS

Athens TO VIMA TIS KYRIAKIS in Greek 9 Oct 83 p 9

/Article by Mikh. Dimitriou: "'Sharks' as Well as 'Crocodiles' Now in the ND'/"

/Text/ The ..."crocodiles" are a new phenomenon in the New Democracy, as the "dolphins" were known earlier who claimed and still claim the leadership from Averof. After the dolphins we had the "sharks" who in turn challenged the claims of the dolphins.

Now we have the crocodiles. These are the deputies who visit everyone (dolphins, sharks and others) and shed...crocodile tears! All these "deputy-crocodiles," as they are called, cry for party unity, promise loyalty to... everyone--but in reality form groups with the difference that they take care to join several groups to "cover their backs."

In any event, the divisive confrontations among the dolphins, among themselves, and with the Averof entourage, form only "the tip" of the iceberg. But those who are familiar with what is going on in the ND headquarters (Rigillis 18) say that the designs of the rivals and the personal games in ND go much further.

Three "memoranda of principles and methods of action" are being drafted (informally and in secret, of course!...) now by named cadres of the Parliamentary Group and refer to the entire spectrum of problems facing the ND.

Thus, after the sharks who threaten, in a forthcoming leadership confrontation, to "eat up" the aging (now!) dolphins, the three memoranda of deputies are a second feature of the intraparty conflict. Averof's insistence on staying as ND leader, the erosion the dolphins appear to have suffered (even among their followers), the strengthening of certain cadres (such as Miltiadis Evert, Giannis Varvitsiotis and Giannis Palaiokrassas who "promise a third solution") have led to an interesting phenomenon. More and more ND deputies avoid identification with factions. Some of them tone down their expressions of devotion while most deputies remain "nonaligned" and promise their support to all dolphins.

The common features of these tendencies are the conviction that "we need to change ideas and mentality rather than persons," the demand for renovating the organization's strategy and tactics, and the tendency to be independent toward the dolphins. But the most revealing feature of these trends and memoranda is above all that the green light for them was given by Averof himself!

According to reliable reports, all these initiatives by deputies take place with Averof's approval--even though the opposite is said behind the scenes and even though Averof's close associates claim that "they don't know anything of the sort."

Averof's "blessings" to these groups of deputies have evident political significance and expediency. This is because these moves do not challenge--at least for the time being--Averof's leadership position, since they call for "a renewal of ideas and methods," and also because they can serve--as they have started to do already--as a counterweight and "a center of counter-attraction" to the goals and the plans of the dolphins!

Thus, among the leading cadres of these moves and tendencies--who have no anti-Averof or anti-party intentions--there is no "known" supporter of a specific dolphin. Instead, these "groups" which discussed and are now preparing the three memoranda are composed of uncommitted deputies who vacillate in their "sympathies" for the candidacy of one or the other of the three "known dolphins."

For this very reason, in spite of the fact that certain of the memoranda authors have close ties with other deputies and have "great respect for them" did not get in touch with them because they are "tainted".

Thus, for example, Voiotia Deputy Aristeidis Tsiplakos was not informed because he was regarded as being close to Konst. Papakonstandinou, Messinia Deputy Nikolaos Anastasopoulos as a known Rallis-supporter, Samos Deputy Themistovalis Sofoulis as "leaning to Mitsotakis," Chios Deputy George Misailidis as an "unrepentant Stefanopoulos adherent," Piraeus Deputy Paulos Sarlis also as a "Papakonstandinou man," Aitolokarnania Deputy Dionysis Livanos as an "unrepentant Rallis man," and others who earlier belonged to the same confidential circles.

By contrast, it is said that several groups sounded out certain deputies who remained reserved because they did not know about the green light given by Averof for these memoranda. These deputies include Anastasis Papaligouras (Korinthias), Kostas Sapsalis (A! Athens), Panourias Panourias (Fthiotis), Froso Spentzari (Ileia), Panagiotis Kleis (Evros), Stavros Tataridis (Evros), Sotiris Papapolitis (Piraeus), and others. This, of course, does not mean that these deputies do not share the renovating ideas and proposals of the memoranda; simply they either did not want to work in drafting them or they were not considered by the others as cooperative.

### One Memorandum Which Will be Delivered...

The revealing story of these moves and initiatives--which has been reported in "a general fashion" without names, detailed proposals or other specific data--is as follows:

In the next few days the former Minister of Culture Andreas Andrianopoulos will deliver to Evangelos Averof a memorandum analyzing the need for the ideological modernization of the party. This text is the product of cooperation and thinking for some time now--in evening meetings and scattered articles--of a group of young deputies, including Vasilis Kondogiannopoulos (Ileia), Vasilis Bekiris (Akhaia), Kostas Giatrakos (Lakonia), Tzanis Tzanetakis (A! Athens), Giorgos Souflias (Larisa), Alexandros Avramidis (Kilkis), and (Averof's relative) Sotiris Khatzigakis (Trikala).

All had had occasional meetings and discussions on the party's political profile and decided to present their proposals on paper, that is, in a memorandum with four typewritten pages. In this memorandum--which its authors claim does not have the character of a "protocol or a manifesto," but which is not without significance for ND's internal affairs--they will define the party's basic ideological principles of "radical liberalism" as they were presented by Karamanlis in the party's Congress in Khalkidiki in 1979. This term--which continues to give the shivers to certain old-rightist deputies--is discussed by the group in the optical angle of "neoliberalism", that is, of the political practice of R. Reagan and M. Thatcher.

As it is emphasized by a deputy of the neoliberal group, who "worked" on the principles of the memorandum, if "in the future only the name of the leader were to change, in 6 months we will have the same problems." The same deputy says that the feuds of the dolphins are not over ideas but over personal influences and promises.

Several other deputies who did not participate in the drafting of the memorandum share the view that the party "does not need a Messiah, but where can you find one today" and the other ideological views of the memorandum. Among them are reported to be the former ministers Miltiadis Evert and Ioannis Paleokrassas.

### War Between "Northerners" and "Southerners"

While this group, which has Andreas Andrianopoulos as the "moving force," includes Athens and southern Greece deputies, there is another invisible and "controlled" movement composed mainly of deputies from northern Greece. Local identification is not the only difference between these two groups and their memoranda. The deputies of northern Greece (we will see who they are) are almost all "hardline rightists."

The deputies of northern Greece do not include in their group any former

ministers and seem to accept the view expressed at the meetings of the Parliamentary Group by the Khios Deputy Georgios Misailidis that "we cannot have up front those who were rejected by the Greek people as a government." By contrast, the Andrianopoulos-Kondogiannopoulos-Tzannetakis group by its very composition is reported to believe that "there are ministers who are compromised and ministers who are unspoiled." (They include in this group Milt. Evert and Ioannis Paleokrassas.)

Moreover, some of the deputies from southern Greece accuse the northerners that they are a group of hardline rightist deputies and that behind their renovating proposals there are also syndicalist objectives; in other words, that the northerners' quest for renewal is centered on their persons and on the positions they will be given.

On the other side, certain northerners accuse the southerners and the Athenian deputies that all they do is talk and talk on unrealistic issues such as the ideology of the party instead of dealing with immediate practical matters such as the party's daily presence and action.

The southerners respond that without clear-cut ideological principles it is impossible to create a modern party of principles and claim that their thoughts are the ones that have attracted the attention of known party cadres. As a recent illustration they mentioned the articles of Athan. Kanellopoulos who--among others--studied the ideological problems of the bourgeoisie today and then presented interesting proposals on all the particular matters. They also mention the articles of younger party cadres such as Vasilis Maginas and Giannis Loulis--in spite of differences on some points--on the need to have a specific renovating framework which will include any renovating strategy and tactics.

This second group, which has the slogan of "genuine and sound renewal and meritocracy in the party as sought by our base" is composed of deputies Georgios Sourlas (Magnisia), Nikolaos Katsaros (Larisa), Vyrion Polydoros (B! Athens), Sotiris Kouvelas (A! Thessaloniki), Levteris Papadimitriou (Arta), Vasilis Papageorgopoulos (A! Thessaloniki), Angelos Valtadoros (Imathia), Theofilos Gatsos (Pella), Ioannis Vagiatis (Kozani), and Konstandinos Gougourelas (Pieria).

The "dynamic deputies" Sourlas and Katsaros, former cadres of the "Volvi" movement, are regarded as the moving force of this movement.

The "front" of this movement in northern Greece is considered to be Sot. Kouvelas for whom many deputies feel that he has not received from Averof the proper treatment. The "leading core" of this movement has composed a draft memorandum with eight points--which will soon be submitted to Averof.

The basic principles of this "innovating tendency" is that the "new profile of this party" must be composed of young and newly elected deputies and for



this reason it is necessary to end the domination of the party in the Chamber of Deputies by "the old and discredited." They also believe that the renewal is not "basically a matter of age" because "there are young with old ideas and the opposite," and therefore their choice does not include only all former ministers and deputy ministers.

They believe--just as the southerners--that there is an image of inactivity at the leading levels of the party mechanism and to the parliamentary representation of ND and that the "talk about the dolphins disorients from the real problem which refers to the changes and the renewal in the party's representation, in the methodology of the struggle, and in the way of thinking of all of us."

The deputies in this group have not decided to create their own mechanism within the party but they give assurances that they will act--especially after their memorandum--as a strong pressure group to promote their views.

#### Work Instead of Dinners

The third memorandum that will be submitted in a few days to Averof will come from the former Minister Miltiadis Evert, and it will follow two other memoranda he submitted to Averof last May and June. With his two earlier memoranda Evert had proposed (following an understanding with Averof) a detailed program of pre-electoral activity both for the parliamentary as well as for the Europarlament elections. He had also included proposals and suggestions on the party's organizational problems, which apparently had not been well received by the "chorus of old timers" around Averof and other influential ND cadres. In his new memorandum, which is said to have 14 pages, Evert refers both to the party's ideological and--especially--organizational problems.

According to certain reports, Evert is said to believe that the structure of the party's organizations is that of a "trade union" with offices and administrative roles (chairman, vice chairman, secretary general, treasurer, and board members) while it is necessary to have a new "battle line."

Specifically, Evert is said to believe that the leadership of the party organizations must include persons responsible for each special sector (organizational, syndicalism, youth, information, ideology, women, local problems, etc.) with coordinated action but on the basis of exclusive responsibility and jurisdiction for each.

Evert is also expected to recommend "broad areas of initiative" for the regional organizations and rights which will extend from the election of their directorate to the proposal of prospective candidates for parliament. According to the same reports, the former minister of finance will propose that the party activity must move away from dinners and similar events and toward action in the various sections of each city and in the places of work, because with these methods PASOK and the communist parties are working very successfully.

According to the same reports, most of Evert's organizational views are shared by deputies Kotas Printzos (Magnisia), Panagiotis Koutras (Thessaloniki), Kostas Sapsalis (A! Athens), Nikos Anastasopoulos (Messinia), Georgios Souflias (Larisa, and other former deputies such as Dimitris Sioufas, Kharis Karatzas, and Khristos Fyssas.

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CSO: 3521/36

## ND CHARGES PRO-PASOK ADMINISTERING OF BIAS SECURITY EXAMS

Athens AKROPOLIS in Greek 29 Sep 83 p 9

/Text/ The ND Public Order Parliamentary Work Group issued an announcement which states, in part:

"The partisan intervention, corruption and the unacceptable confrontations by Greek citizens and especially policemen became clearly apparent in the entrance examinations of the candidate officers of the Security Corps.

"The deceitful methods of the Public Order Ministry authorities in promoting their partisan friends is obvious.

"The appointment of known docile-greenguards to the examination committees and the early appointment of different psychologists and sociologists chosen by the leadership of the Public Order Ministry to examine the mental and intellectual qualifications of the candidates (something introduced for the first time) does not ensure uniformity in grading.

"High grades for preferred candidates are assured by not keeping secret the name of the person taking the test. The specially selected questions from the Marxist literature and the communist sloganeering insulted the intelligence of the candidates, many of whom refused to accept this humiliation and as a result received low grades."

7520

CSO: 3521/36

## WAR ON INFLATION CAUSING INCREASED POLITICAL TENSION

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 9 Oct 83 p 15

[Article by Kicki Borhammar]

[Text] Iceland, Friday--Is Iceland on the way out of its crisis or is the government leading the country toward unemployment and chaos with its austerity policy?

That will be the big issue when the Icelandic Parliament throws open its doors on Monday and the government allows parliamentary work to resume following a 7-month interruption. The debate is expected to be a hot one both inside and outside Parliament's walls, and the first thing to face Parliament's members will be the union movement's protest against what it calls undemocratic working methods and persecution.

"We all want to be spared inflation, but this is pure insanity."

So comments Sigridur Edda, a fish cleaner in one of Reykjavik's fish plants, in a tired voice. In effect, her wages have dropped by one-third in just a few months, and she no longer believes in the government's inflation policy. Her name now appears along with those of thousands of others on the protest lists that will be presented to the 60 members of Iceland's Parliament on Monday.

The lists of names, which were collected under the auspices of the union movement, are not only a protest against the government's economic policy but also primarily a demand that Iceland be allowed to have a place among the world's democracies and that the right to strike and bargain be restored to the union movement. That right, which was regarded as self-evident for so long, was suddenly abolished on 27 May, when the newly installed conservative coalition government decreed measures for straightening out the economic situation.

## Inflation

The debate over the economic problems was nothing new at the time. On the contrary, the country's reduced earnings had long been the center of attention, and after the election in March, the public was expecting strong measures for coping with deficits and galloping inflation, which was on its way to passing

the 100-percent mark. All the same, the government's measures came as a bomb-shell and were immediately branded fascist by the national union's press.

The measures in question--which the conservative Independence Party and the Progressive Party, a more liberal-minded rural party, had agreed on--were aimed chiefly at wages and the indexing system with its cost-of-living adjustment every 3 months, which for a number of years had guaranteed the individual that his wages would stay more or less in step with inflation. That system was singled out as the economy's chief enemy, and it was suspended until May 1985. At the same time, the parties in the labor market were prohibited from concluding wage agreements before February 1984 at the earliest.

There was no legislation concerning a price freeze, but the government promised a tough struggle on that front as well.

#### Explanations

After governing for barely 5 months, Prime Minister Steingrímur Hermannson is now priding himself on having succeeded with his economic policy. Inflation has been checked, and he is promising that it will be below 30 percent by the first of the year. He emphasizes that in the long run, this will be of great importance to the individual and that the country is on its way out of the economic crisis it got into when its fishing luck changed, the nets were being drawn from the sea half empty, and prices for Iceland's export goods dropped.

During a few weeks of intense activity before the opening of Parliament, the prime minister has been traveling around the island to explain what the government is really doing for its countrymen, and it is obvious that the Icelanders are not only willing to listen but are also demanding an explanation.

The reason is that during the time the government has been in power, wage earners have seen their real incomes worsen drastically. Prices have continued to rise, as has the loan index, which was previously tied to the wage index, while the latter has now been abolished. This means that the individual Icelandic's financial situation is very tight today.

The standard of living, measured in terms of material things, may seem to be on a par with that in the other Nordic countries. The difference, however, is that Icelanders in general are surviving by going into debt and are often forced to work tremendous amounts of overtime to support themselves. Indebtedness begins when one has to buy an apartment. The rental market is practically nonexistent, and an average apartment is expensive. For people who have just bought a place to live, therefore, there is nothing extra left over. It was precisely within that group that the rebellion against the government started last summer, when people who had never been politically active before got together to demand better terms for borrowing.

#### Irritation

The irritation has increased steadily since then. More and more critical voices have been raised, especially within the union movement, and there have



been calls for political strikes. It is obvious that patience has now run out. It seems that the members of Parliament will barely have time to dust off their political seats before being forced to tackle the problems. The union movement will see to that, promises Asmundun Stefanson, chairman of the ASI [Icelandic Federation of Labor].

Stefanson says: "It is obvious that we are at war with the government's economic policy. Everybody can see that what is being done is no solution."

Asmundun Stefanson has already expressed his willingness to cooperate with the government to overcome the crisis, but he says that first and foremost, the union movement's democratic rights must be restored.

He warns: "The members of Parliament must pay attention to the protest lists and repeal the law from May, because we do not intend to wait until February."

#### Polarization

Now that Parliament is going back to work, the government is generally expected to be in hot water. Political polarization has increased, and despite very different party programs, the four opposition parties are standing out more and more as a leftist alternative to the conservative government. If, in addition, the government rejects the demands that it restore bargaining rights to the parties in the labor market, it is also very possible that the opposition will receive considerable help from the union movement in its fight to unseat the government, and the winter months may be very turbulent on the Icelandic labor market.

11/792

OSO: 3650/8

## GROWING MOVEMENT, POLITICAL PARTY AGAINST FOREIGNERS

Paris LE MONDE in French 11-12 Sep 83 p 5

[Article by correspondent Rene Ter Steege: "The Deputy Who Wants to Expel Foreigners"]

[Text] The election of a member of an extreme rightwing party to a city council seat on an "anti-immigrant" platform is quite an event--the French found this out in Dreux. What if, as happened in the Netherlands, he had been a deputy?

Amsterdam--The Netherlands cares about its reputation for being tolerant and hospitable toward foreigners. However, since the last general elections, a political party pursuing the avowed objective of sending back to their own countries as many foreigners as possible has a seat in the Parliament of The Hague.

Last September the extreme rightwing party (despite its name: Centrumpartij [Center Party]) won a seat in the Chamber of Deputies. That victory was an embarrassment both for the journalists who reluctantly went to interview Mr Hans Janmaat, the newly elected official, and for political circles forced, from that point on, to face a fact which they had pretended to ignore--the fact that a substantial number of voters think that "foreigners" are responsible for many of the country's troubles and that the government must get rid of them.

In the Netherlands, the proportional representation system works to the advantage of small political parties. The Center Party only needed 68,368 votes (0.8 percent of the votes cast) to win a seat.

The Christian Democrat Andreas van Agt, who was prime minister at the time, claimed to have been "shocked" by the electoral result. But it was not a total surprise.

Journalists, for instance, were perfectly aware of the xenophobic and racist feelings expressed by people in their own homes, in streetcars and buses, in cafes and department stores and in the markets of the big towns in

the western part of the country. The press chose to remain silent about that regrettable reality for fear of exacerbating the situation and in the hope that it would disappear by itself.

When that "rule of silence" was broken, the center-left daily HAT PAROOL of Amsterdam decided to dispatch its reporters on the day after the elections to some of the run-down neighborhoods of the capital city to conduct an opinion poll among the Dutch people who live there side by side with immigrants.

The ensuing reportage was interspersed with remarks so deeply racist that the newspaper apologized to its readers for the language used by people who "dislike their neighbors and are not afraid to say so."

"The Netherlands are bursting at the seams and it is the foreigners' fault," is the slogan underlying the Center Party's entire "program." What is the reality? According to the latest figures, some 700,000 foreigners, representing 5 percent of the population, were living in the Netherlands last year.

#### Two Hundred Thousand Surinamese

Among the 'buitenlander' [outsiders], the largest group consists of 200,000 Surinamese amounting to half of the population of the former Dutch colony in South America. Close to 30,000 people came to settle in the Netherlands from the Netherlands Antilles where only the island of Aruba wants to be independent. The presence of the Surinamese and that of 35,000 Moluccans indicates that the decolonization policy was badly carried out.

Then we have the 148,000 Turkish immigrant workers ("guest workers" in Dutch) and their families and 94,000 Moroccans.

Even before the economic crisis came to add fuel to the resentment of many Dutch nationals against immigrant workers (one-fourth of whom are currently unemployed), these workers had become the targets of systematic attacks. In 1973 and in 1976 the neo-fascist party Netherlands Popular Union (NVU) went as far as to organize "punitive raids" in districts of Rotterdam with a large Turkish population. The Center Party, founded in 1980, claims that it is "neither a rightwing nor a leftwing party" but "the party of people's discontent," as stated in a now popular slogan.

In its radio and television broadcasts, which invariably produce a wave of protests, the Center Party describes itself as the paramount spokesman of Dutch "victims" of an immigration policy which it considers as having disastrous consequences for the "natives." Speaking in sorrowful, yet never aggressive, tone Mr Janmaat goes on to describe what he considers to be the sad lot of people living in old neighborhoods who no longer feel at home "surrounded by so many mosques subsidized by the state."

Mr Janmaat, who is close to 50 years old, projects an image which is the exact opposite of an extremist thug. As a matter of fact, this former high

school teacher--who used to teach the subject described as "knowledge of society" in the Dutch secondary education syllabus--is completely lacking in charisma. Opposed to all manner of ostentation in his attire or speech, Mr Janmaat tries to speak as the man in the street, although he has an advanced degree in Political Science and used to belong to conspicuously bourgeois parties before moving to the forefront of the extreme-right stage.

Other leaders of the Center Party also come from academic circles. Many of them are high school teachers and...former activists of environmental movements. The latter have not given up their former cause in their new capacities. They describe the presence of immigrants in an overpopulated country as a contributing factor to the pollution of the environment. Allsorts societies for the protection of animals, the "greens of the extreme right" are also protesting against the ritual slaughter of lambs during Jewish religious holidays.

Dutch people who live in the old neighborhoods of large cities are the targets of the party. Only the poorest have to go on living in those neighborhoods because as soon as they can afford to move very few young couples choose to go on living in those dilapidated and crowded apartments built in the previous century, in the dirty streets fouled by masses of dogs in the "old Amsterdam" where the few tourists who stray into the area are quick to retrace their steps.

#### Refused To Shake Hands

An increasing number of "natives" moved out of that area to the distant suburbs or "polders" where satellite towns for the middle class are going up. Arab, Moroccan and Surinamese immigrants moved in. The City Council of Amsterdam estimates that by the year 1990 one of every five inhabitants in the city will be a foreigner. The same will be true for half of the primary schools' population in the capital. Today, foreigners account for 12 percent of the population of Rotterdam.

That is why it does not come as a surprise that many of the Dutch people living in what used to be working class districts, and who by tradition voted for the Socialist Party, decided to switch their vote to the Center Party in the last general elections. Polls show that 25 percent of the votes received by the Center Party came from these people and 10 percent from the Socialist Party. The Center Party looks to the future with optimism since half of those who voted for it are under 35 years of age.

When Mr Janmaat entered the Parliament of The Hague to the boos of demonstrators, the other 149 deputies refused to shake hands with the newcomer who went on being totally ignored by his colleagues. The deputies had agreed to leave the debate chamber as soon as Mr Janmaat got up to speak denouncing the immigration policy.

## Misguided Boycott

This tactic of vacant seats was a serious mistake and its effect on the voters was probably the exact opposite of what was intended. The axiom which says that "silence gives consent" was taken in its literal sense by many television viewers who saw 149 deputies either unwilling or unable to contradict Mr Janmaat's outburst of condemnation against the naturalization policy during which he brought out confidential files to support his theory that The Hague is knowingly allowing "criminal elements" to become full citizens of the Netherlands.

The televised sight of a deputy addressing a chamber from which all his colleagues, with the exception of the chairman of the chamber, had departed is something likely to arouse feelings of sympathy toward the person who is being ostracized. Beside, and according to the polls, the broadcasts of the Center Party have attracted quite a good following. So the tactic of empty seats has contributed to increasing Mr Janmaat's popularity ratings and, if we are to believe some forecasts, his party would be sure to win three seats if new elections were to take place tomorrow.

Frightened by these developments, the 149 deputies were conspicuously present just before the June parliamentary recess when the socialist chairwoman of the Naturalization Commission addressed the chamber to refute, on their behalf, Mr Janmaat's accusations which are based, according to her, on "rigged or false" statistics. Will this open confrontation turn out to be effective? Mr Janmaat already knows that he has succeeded in putting the blame on the government and Parliament for the ostrich-like policy of refusing to face an embarrassing reality which could damage the reputation of the Netherlands.

8796

CSO: 3619/6



## PCE EXECUTIVE MEETING PUSHED UP, GALLEGO RESIGNATION KEY ITEM

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 13 Oct 83 p 15

[Article by Joaquina Prades: "Executive Committee of PCE Moves Meeting up 4 Days to Analyze Current Situation"]

[Text] The leadership of the Communist Party of Spain has decided to move the executive committee meeting, originally scheduled for Tuesday, 18 October, to tomorrow, Friday. The secretary general, Gerardo Iglesias, prefers to remain silent about Ignacio Gallego's decision to resign his duties in the executive and Central Committees of the party and to announce, in a letter sent to the members of the Central Committee, that he will not participate in the next national party congress. Iglesias leaves the official position of the PCE to the declaration which the executive committee will issue tomorrow. In consequence, the resignation of Gallego, historic director of the party, will be one of the central themes of the meeting, which Santiago Carrillo is expected to attend.

Some members of the secretariat consulted yesterday by this newspaper affirmed, speaking personally, since the official decision will be taken tomorrow by the executive committee, that they did not think that Ignacio Gallego would be impeached or expelled from the party, despite the fact that a situation of conflict of interest, prohibited by existing statutes, might arise.

Ignacio Gallego states in his letter, of which a detailed summary is offered on this same page, that he is resigning from his duties in the party, but that he does not refuse to continue in its ranks as a rank-and-file member. Nevertheless, Pere Ardiaca, president of the Communist Party of Catalonia (PCC)--formed by the pro-Soviet dissidents of the PSUC [Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia]--indicated that Gallego has confirmed his attendance at the party of the official press organ of the PCC, the magazine AVANT, scheduled for this weekend in Barcelona, and that precisely this participation will place him, in fact, outside the PCE.

Andreu Claret, spokesman for the PCE press and member of the secretariat, announced yesterday that, although the situation of conflict of interest may occur in the case of Ignacio Gallego, the current party leaders are not in favor of applying disciplinary measures. "If a member of the PCE places himself, by his deeds or words, outside the party," said Claret, "there is no need to expel him because he has already taken himself out of our ranks."

The aforementioned letter sent by Gallego to the members of the central committee of the PCE has been called "very harsh" by the current leaders, although one of the sources consulted yesterday assured us that Ignacio Gallego was very sincere. "He has now said in the letter," he affirmed, "what he has always thought and, in a disciplined manner, kept silent because of his personal attachment to Santiago Carrillo. Ignacio Gallego has always been pro-Soviet; not a Eurocommunist, although he has never voted against Santiago Carrillo, not even when the latter adopted a markedly Eurocommunist line."

#### The Role of Carrillo

The same sources from the secretariat affirm that Carrillo is, to some extent, responsible for the public separation of Gallego. "One of the declarations of Santiago Carrillo in the recent meeting of the European movie industry, in Madrid, justified for the first time this type of decision," affirmed a member of the leaders' group. "It was, specifically, that sentence about 'I would understand if some comrades should decide to leave,'" he added.

The last executive committee of the PCE, which preferred to officially ignore Carrillo's declarations at this meeting, did treat in great detail that remark, "and one of the things which most worried us," our source commented, "was precisely that phrase, because it was telling those who do not agree with Eurocommunism, 'I have always asked you to stay in the party, but now that I'm no longer secretary general, you can leave if you feel that more appropriate to your convictions.'"

Yesterday, a holiday, this paper attempted to get in touch with Jaime Ballesteros, Julio Anguita, Armando Lopez Salinas, Enrique Curiel, Santiago Carrillo and Nicolas Sartorius, but they were all away from home.

12472

CSO: 3548/36

## PCE'S GALLEGO QUILTS OVER IGLESIAS' EUROCOMMUNISM

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 13 Oct 83 p 15

[Article: "Ignacio Gallego Hates Eurocommunism and Reformers"]

[Text] Madrid. Communist Ignacio Gallego, who has decided to quit his posts in the PCE and has announced his intention of not attending the Eleventh National Congress, expresses in the letter sent to the members of the Central Committee, to which EL PAIS has had access, his political disagreements with the current leaders, rejects Eurocommunism and repeats his refusal to participate, "even in the opposition, in a project which removes from the PCE its content of class, ideology, principles of organization and, in short, its transformational and revolutionary mission," although he assures that he will remain in the PCE as a rank-and-file member.

In the 24-page letter, Ignacio Gallego criticizes the preparation of the Eleventh Congress for using, according to him, arbitrary methods such as not permitting those who differ to express their opinion before the organization, "It cannot be a congress for ideological clarification and for the unity of the communists," he affirms. "Respecting the position of other comrades in this matter, I will not attend this congress."

"My identification with the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism," he continues, "puts me in conflict with what the majority of you call Eurocommunist strategy... I know, too, that not a few of those who were distinguished by their antidogmatism have ended up defending the dogmas of social democracy. Forgetting the revolutionary principles leads inevitably to confusion, practicality and, definitively, reform, under one cover or another."

The veteran communist asks several questions in his letter: What did the spectacular abandonment of Leninism give the Spanish communists? What did the repeated reprimands to socialist countries do for us? What results did we get from our policy of social pacts, aside from weakening the Workers' Commissions? What has the abandonment of our own identity brought us?

Gallego concludes:

"Eurocommunism has produced great damage for us, but your plan to renew Eurocommunism, to prosper, would mean the liquidation of the Communist Party.

I refuse to silence what should be known by all communists: the positions defended by the current leadership in the ideological, political and organizational aspects are the same ones whose imposition was attempted by the reformers, many of whom quickly found their positions in the PSOE [Socialist Workers' Party of Spain]."

After affirming that he "likes" the traditional symbols, such as the hammer and sickle and the words of the "Internationale," Ignacio Gallego points out: "My communist convictions oblige me to say no to the current leadership; no to the congress of the Eurocommunist reformers, no to the elimination of the party of Jose Diaz, Pasionaria and thousands of men and women who gave their lives in the defense of liberty," even though, "I'm not breaking with the Communist Party, which I have served all my life in the functions and tasks which it has given me and to which I will always dedicate all my strength."

"In Spain there are more than 100,000 Communists who left the party," he argues, "or who were expelled for, among other reasons, their identification with Leninist ideas and their sympathy for the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. We all know that in Catalonia the majority of the Communists are organized in the PCC (Communist Party of Catalonia). Others are in assorted groups. The greatest part is disorganized, but willing to return to a Communist Party which will offer them the possibility of fighting for the ideal of a classless society. In these circumstances, the principle task which we should undertake is to create conditions for the unity of all communists based on a revolutionary program. For that purpose, one must recover the ideas of Marx and Lenin and offer the youth an ideal worth fighting for."

Save the Hammer and Sickle

Ignacio Gallego affirms that "patience has a limit," and asks how to "defend the true Communist Party better" in the face of the "liquidationism" of the reformers: "To state that the PCE doesn't have any ideology is liquidationism; to say that you don't like the hammer and sickle as a symbol is liquidationism; to say that the words of the 'Internationale' are no good is liquidationism; to say that there will no longer be revolutionary crises in Spain or in Europe is liquidationism."

The letter points out that those who will attend the coming congress are not going to study the documents, "as extensive as they are disorderly," written by the current leadership: Their participation will consist, at most, of voting in favor of the Eurocommunism which has led us to this situation, or in favor of those who, barely keeping up appearances, propose the liquidation of the Communist Party." Facing this situation, Gallego cites Santiago Carrillo to affirm that, "it is certain that, indignant because of the disloyalty of those whom he thought to be faithful to him, he will not accept the secondary role in which these people are attempting to confine him."

12472

CSO: 3548/36

## PCE'S IGLESIAS HOLDS PRESS CONFERENCE IN ELCHE

Madrid MUNDO OBRERO in Spanish 7-13 Oct 83 pp 8-9

[Text] At a press conference held in Elche, Secretary General of the PCE [Spanish Communist Party] Gerardo Iglesias pointed out that the least satisfactory aspect of government policy is just that aspect that concerns the country's most important problem: work stoppages. "Work stoppages continue to grow," he said, "even though the rate of increase has diminished. In real terms, there are more work stoppages every day. For this reason, our disagreement with the government begins with its economic policy. They condition a solution on the recovery of the international economy, which is basically dependent on the United States, Japan and Germany, and on a monetarist policy. But this is not a real solution for Spain, because it overlooks the measures that it is absolutely necessary for us to take. After having learned what the general government budget for next year will be, we have to say that the increase in public investment is ridiculous and that this could be an insurmountable handicap for our economy. Without public investment, how are we going to finance agrarian reform, how are we going to cover unemployment when even now 70 percent of those without work receive no compensation?"

## Reconversion With Reindustrialization

The PCE secretary general expressed his agreement with the need to reduce the public deficit but said it should not be done at any cost or by putting the burden on the workers' shoulders: "We do not say 'no' to reconversion, but it is necessary to do it on the basis of serious plans for reindustrialization that, of course, do not appear to exist at present. On the contrary, what we are seeing could hardly be more alarming: in Sagunto, the same thing is happening, I fear, that happened in Mieres where the answer to a need for 40,000 jobs was the establishment of a factory that will employ 40 workers. The matter is even more serious if we take into account the fact that the necessity for trade union participation in the negotiations evaporated in August, when the harsh measures taken without further ado by the government began to manifest themselves."

"In the recent parliamentary debate," said Gerardo Iglesias, "Felipe Gonzalez promised to reopen negotiations. But what is there to negotiate when the budget has already been drawn up? It serves no purpose for the head of government to allude to negotiations when things have already reached such a pass as to rule them out. The facts are that the workers have already shown their willingness to make sacrifices for the sake of the country, to tighten their belts, but the social compensations that might partially justify all this are nowhere in evidence."



In response to other questions from journalists, Gerardo commented on the subject of autonomy: "It seems to me," the communist leader answered, "that the PSOE does not know what to do. The fact is that there are no fixed standards, except the Constitution, bearing on the question of autonomy. And for this reason, what the government has to do is sit down and negotiate."

#### NATO Referendum

Gerardo's characterization of the government's foreign policy could hardly have been more forthright: "Bad, very bad. It is taking steps backwards. Insofar as NATO is concerned the policy bears no relation to what the PSOE was saying when it was in the opposition and we were working side by side. At that time, Felipe Gonzalez, then a deputy said that if the UCD [Democratic Center Union] put us in NATO by a simple majority vote in parliament, we could get out again by a similar procedure. But now he is not even carrying out his promise to hold a referendum on the matter. And the argument that the moment is not propitious is untenable, because things are getting more complicated every day."

"Personally," Gerardo added, "I doubt that he will hold a referendum unless there is great social pressure in favor of it--popular pressure such as we see, on the international level, in Holland, in Central Europe generally and on the part of the masses and institutions, to which, surprisingly, Felipe Gonzalez appears to be not merely indifferent but even hostile."

In response to another question, Gerardo Iglesias declared that the danger of war is very real at the present time: "The growing intervention by the United States in Lebanon and Central America and the membership of Spain itself in NATO are factors that add to international tensions. And regarding such membership, it must be said that it is in no respect to our advantage: Spain is weakened by it in such fields as negotiations with Great Britain over Gibraltar and our entry into the European Economic Community, because the more we are aligned the less independence and autonomy we have in our positions, and at the same time we forgo possibilities for dealing with the Third World and the Arabs."

#### Fraga Loading His Guns

Such present-day subjects as the so-called "catechism war," PCE's internal situation and case of General Soteras were also discussed.

"The catechism war," Gerardo said, "smacks of a 'show.' It shows how little the church's thinking has evolved; nevertheless, behind all this there may be the much less readily acknowledged interest in money, in securing the financing of private education and in the tightening and loosening of LOPE.... In any case, the government's solution cannot be described as elegant."

With respect to the PCE's situation, he said that there are objective data pointing to a significant recovery. "What comes out of the 11th party congress will

be fundamental. It is impossible to conceive of a Communist Party that does not have extensive contacts with society, and after the congress we could see an avalanche of enrollments." In answer to a question, Gerardo said that such growth need not be at the PSOE's expense, "because we have our own natural constituency and are not dependent on the PSOE's political misfortunes, which are also negative from our standpoint. In this country, Fraga represents the chief danger and we should not overlook the indications that he is getting ready to go on the offensive."

Finally, he expressed the concern of the communists over the socialists' failure to make the promised changes with regard to the armed forces and police. "We are in agreement," he said, "that General Soteras should be removed because of his statements, but this is an ad hoc action and we lack a progressive policy on the subject. The ratification of the Civil Guard's military character especially surprised us. It may be that any action in this area has to be taken with kid gloves but one cannot be fearful or timid. The necessary reforms will not be accomplished with praise but with changes and reforms."

#### Rally in Elche

Many of the ideas that we have just outlined above were amplified by Gerardo Iglesias at a rally which, moments after the press conference, he held in Elche.

He criticized the government's failure to carry out its promise to create 800,000 new jobs--a figure later reduced to 640,000 "in which no one believes." Because, the PCE secretary general explained, there are two ways to meet the crisis: by depending on what happens outside the country or by relying on the country's own capabilities and resources, though without ignoring the international situation. But in order to do the latter--which is what Gerardo reproaches the government for not doing--it is necessary to have recourse to public investment and to democratize, invigorate and reorganize state-owned industry. "If the government does not do this," he indicated, "it is following a policy that has to be called by its right name: liberal. It is what Reagan and Mrs Thatcher are doing and results directly in the elimination of jobs. Because liberalism means leaving the initiative to private enterprise, allowing the latter to be subsidized by the taxpayer without trying to convert the public sector into an engine capable of driving the economy."

#### Policy of the Multinational Companies

Gerardo asked rhetorically if there was no other possible policy in Spain today. "Yes, there is, a policy based on an increase in public investment, one that is not that advocated by Ferrer Salat, Rafael Termes or the multinational companies, one that increases the financial pressure on those who have the most and not on the workers, one that results in the taking of measures that are part of the PSOE's program and campaign promises and as a consequence of which that party won 10 million votes on the Left.

"A policy that would not win from Fraga the praises that he has just bestowed on the government in parliament and that would not receive the kudos given Minister of Economy Miguel Boyer recently by economists of the Chicago school but that would help in one way or another Spain's most disadvantaged citizens."

## Call for Unity

What is to be done then? Gerardo Iglesias proposed the unifying and massive mobilization of the workers in order to change the government's economic policy. A mobilization that is necessary for its own sake, not just as a challenge to the government, in order to defend peace or, in his words, "for the defense of everyone's skin." In this connection, he argued that Spain ought to follow its traditional role of neutrality and not involve itself with military blocs but stay clear of them, and he repeated his press conference observations about the necessity of a referendum in order to leave NATO and reject the balance of terror of the arms race. "But I fear that the PSOE fully intends to remain in NATO, especially as Felipe Gonzalez himself has gratuitously spoken in favor of the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons on European territory."

Gerardo also criticized harshly the lack of reforms in the armed forces and in television, lack of action on the proposal to decriminalize abortion and, especially, the government's support for the two-part concept, in accordance with which it pretends that there are only two parties in Spain, the Socialist Party and Popular Alliance, and that the other parties do not deserve even to participate in talks dealing with the country's important problems. "But social changes, as history shows, always come about through social mobilization. And if the trade unions and working class masses do not support the PSOE, how can it stand up to the Bank of Spain, the United States and Fraga?"

## Without Criticism, There Is Only Bureaucracy

Finally, after referring to the urgency of formulating a policy capable of getting young people interested in social action, he alluded to the crisis affecting the PCE and the present process of reform "aimed at achieving a party whose members are neither social democrats nor Soviet apologists, neither self-qualified nor self-disqualified but simply communists. A party that is aware of the fact that, when there is neither criticism nor discussion, the only thing created is a bureaucracy. A party alert to every day difficulties, the secretary general of which is in Gijon when there is a mobilization in Gijon, the vice secretary of which, Enrique Curiel, is in Vigo when the workers rebel in Vigo and whose other vice secretary, Jaime Ballesteros, is in Sagunto when the problems of the working class reach a boiling point in Sagunto."

He ended by calling for the achievement of an Eleven Party Congress that would serve to unite all comrades.

12336

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## SOCIALIST, COMMUNIST DEPUTIES ATTACK PUJOL

Barcelona AVUI in Catalan 29 Sep 83 p 8

[Article by J. Andreu]

[Text] Barcelona--As was expected, parliamentary excitement ran high yesterday. The introduction by the opposition--socialists and communists--of the issue of the Catalan Bank and the personal attacks on President Pujol served to heat a debate which, up to then, had been growing stale and humdrum, if we leave aside the happenings that Dr Hortela always includes in his interventions.

We have already said that the big novelty was the personal attacks. The first of them was personified by Antonio Gutierrez (PSUC) [Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia], who said to the president, "You, Mr Pujol, have been an error, a serious historical error," while Lluís Armet (PSC) (PSC-PSOE) [Socialist Party of Catalonia-Spanish Socialist Workers Party] told him: "You are a man with some polemical qualities, but without statesmanlike vision or the vision of a man of the people." Jordi Pujol replied saying, "I am glad for these personal attacks; this means that conventional weapons have been exhausted."

## Socialist Speeches

There was suspense in listening to the socialist spokesman, Lluís Armet, who had prepared a good speech. Basically, it was the best in form. Undoubtedly he and Pujol were the best speakers, but Armet committed some tactical errors that allowed President Pujol to reply easily. So Armet said that the Generalitat had not achieved integration of the immigrants, and Pujol, with supple dialectic which Armet did not capture--led the issue to the problem of the division or not of Catalan society, accusing the socialists of bringing up this issue every time the elections drew near. In the corridors there was talk even of Lerrrouxist renewals, socialist takeover. Armet accused the Council of engaging in exclusivistic politics and, it is clear, Pujol made sure to recall, that the PSC had refused to form part of the Council and, more recently, of the mixed commissions. He concluded, "We did not exclude them; they excluded themselves." Armet somewhat glossed over the economic issue, and incomprehensively wanted to play the letter of the LOAPA. At this point President Pujol gave a crusher--and let us not exaggerate--to the socialist spokesman in reading before the house a prospectus of the Socialists Party entitled, moreover, "Why Do We Defend the LOAPA and not the LPA?" Finally, you might say the issue of the Catalan Bank received little clarification--perhaps the communists will speak of it again--but it served Pujol to say that he was pressured to withdraw or shelve the appeal against the LOAPA in exchange for not striking up the issue of the financial institution.

#### PSUC Speech

The speech of Gutierrez Diaz was also awaited curiously, since he is a deputy who is always in the limelight. But yesterday, for some reason, he was disappointing. Why? Perhaps because it was too obvious that he was not giving his own speech. "This reeks of the sidewalk.... This reeks of Luchetti.... This is Espasa." A potpourri that lacked the dialectical agility of the secretary general. Besides, with his prelude of personal attack in the reply, Gutierrez Diaz caused the president not to come out again.

Joan Hortalà had it easy. Perhaps it was the time he found it easier to give the government support. And he also availed himself of the chance to recall the sacrifices of the party, Republican Left, in favor of the consolidation of Catalonia.

Let us leave President Pujol for last. He has acted strongly and firmly. And more forceful and convincing than he has been for some time. And the supercouncillors? The ruling of the LOAPA? The resentment of Estats? The long vacations? Yesterday a daily qualified the speech as social democratic. Maybe not so much. Clearly conformist, yes indeed, in a liberal line. In any case, in a third, Catalan way, yes indeed.

12448

CSO: 3348/30



## CRIMINAL PROSECUTION LAW TO PROVIDE FOR LEGAL COUNSEL

Madrid ABC in Spanish 30 Sep 83 p 19

[Article by Jose Maria Fernandez-Rua]

[Text] Madrid--Congress yesterday approved of modification of Articles 520 and 527 of the law of criminal prosecution to expand Article 17 of the Constitution regarding legal counsel for those under arrest or imprisonment. The General Assembly of the House rejected the changes that sought to alter the proposed law substantially.

Among the proposed but rejected changes were those defended by the Basque Left deputy, Juan Maria Bandres, and the communist, Perez Royo.

Both these deputies agreed to ask for modification of the proposed law so as to "be against the interests of the person under arrest only insofar as is absolutely necessary"; a plan which was rejected by the socialists. Pablo Castellano, PSOE deputy representing Caceres and chairman of the Justice Commission of Interior, told Bandres that with his proposed change, the counsel would be relegated to the status of a second defendant under arrest, and share the fate of the accused. Regarding mistreatment, an issue raised by Juan Maria Bandres, Castellano stated that this law is not intended to prevent mistreatment, but to defend a higher social right. "It would be good," said the socialist deputy, "for that presumption only to be for offenders. We shall in no way allow the laws to contain implicit accusations of guilt."

By means of this proposed law, the government assumes an active role in the defense of the rights of citizens, setting up government agents as guarantors of these rights, and moreover compelling the participation of third parties--counsel and attorneys--to eliminate every temptation to abuse or outrage or any suspicion of partiality.

"The proposed law which is now being approved," the minister continued, "is a qualitative step forward in the concept of legal counsel and considers legal counsel to be a guarantor in all cases and conditions of citizens' freedom. A guarantee whose presence in the assumption of deprivation of freedom is absolutely imperative."

Elsewhere during his presentation, Minister Ledesma explained that this proposed law makes of elgal counsel a right that cannot be waived.

With the modification of Articles 520 and 527 of the law of criminal prosecution, the attorney shall not be limited, as he has been up to now, to being present as a spectator at the cross-examination, but as the constitution orders, he will help the person under arrest, joining in his statement and in the proceedings for the purpose of ascertaining or inquiring into the facts, the contribution that, owing to his knowledge and experience, he deems useful to the defense.

12448

CSO: 3548/29

## RISE IN LAYMEN ENROLLMENT IN THEOLOGICAL EDUCATION

Madrid YA in Spanish 13 Oct 83 p 20

[text] The number of laymen studying theology in Spain is now quite considerable and has increased steadily for several years. According to the most recent data of the Episcopal Subcommittee on Universities, 533 laymen--355 men and 176 women--are enrolled in the 8 existing theological schools. However, if the other 33 theological centers and higher institutions of religious studies in Spain are taken into account, the total is actually much greater.

For example, 228 laymen, including a large number of women, are studying theology at the Higher Institute of Religious Studies of the Madrid Diocesan Seminary alone. At lower levels--at the diocesan theological schools and theological and catechetical centers--there are a great many. The Toledo catechetical school, which is connected with the Institute of Theology for Laymen, has 72 laymen, who are studying theology for 3 years, taking 2 classes of 2 hours each daily. Some 108 laymen are studying at the catechetical school of the Saint Plus X Higher Institute for Catechetical Studies.

## Postgraduate Theological Studies

The Comillas Pontifical University in Madrid has organized a program of postgraduate studies in theology, especially designed for laymen who already have a university degree. The first graduates of this program have just completed their studies this year. Fees for all the activities involved in the program amount to 36,000 pesetas. The courses are designed principally for people leading an active life and with professional responsibilities, who want to acquire deeper understanding of their faith and relate it to their culture.

Even though neither massive nor characteristic of a majority, the growing interest of laymen in the serious and systematic study of religious matters is self-evident, and this could mean a small revolution within the church, especially as there are many opportunities for lay participation in responsible tasks. At our Catholic universities, an ever-increasing number of people, without being matriculated, take classes as auditors.

## Degrees not Recognized by Civil Authorities in Spain

The degree awarded by theological schools is comparable with any bachelor's degree awarded by Spanish universities insofar as the academic level is concerned.

Nevertheless, in contrast to the situation in other countries, these studies are not recognized by the civil authorities in Spain. In Germany, theological schools are part of the group of civil universities and are supported by the state like any other university. Nonrecognition by the civil authorities is a serious problem of which the Spanish bishops are well aware. For some time, it has been one of the subjects they have forcefully raised in conversations between the church and state. The subject is addressed in the 1979 expansion of the church-state agreements. Article II of the agreement on education states: "The Catholic Church, in accordance with its own law, maintains its freedom to establish universities, schools, higher institutes and other centers of religious studies for the preparation of priests, monks and nuns and laymen. Approval of such studies and recognition by the state for civil purposes of the degrees awarded by such higher centers of learning will be the object of specific regulation by the competent church and state authorities."

### Three Cycles

Studies at a theological school are divided into three cycles. The first cycle, after students have finished with COU [expansion unknown], having normally completed intermediate studies, comprises 5 years, the first 2 of which are predominantly on philosophical subjects. At the end of these 5 years, the student is awarded the degree of bachelor [bachillerato] in theology, which would be the equivalent of at least a diplomat in higher university studies. The second cycle comprises 2 more years, specifically devoted to one of the branches of theology. At the end of these 7 years, having successfully met all tests, including the project, the student is given the degree [licenciatura] in theology. The third cycle, that of research and qualification for university teaching, is the doctorate. After completion of a number of courses and preparation, defense and publication of the thesis, the degree of doctor of theology is awarded.

The book "Los estudios de teología," [Theology studies] published by the University-Business Foundation in its collection "Monografías profesionales," [Professional monographs] defines the theologian as "a person who is preoccupied by the subjects of faith and its role in life, who reflects critically on these subjects and wishes to understand the Revelation, man and the world through the word of God. He is an active and informed member of the church who seeks to grasp present-day church and world realities in order to transform them according to the will of God. He is also a Christian who believes and thinks, who can express his faith, maintain his hopes and show his love, transmitting the message of Jesus Christ to his fellow human beings. With such a person, one does not so much teach theology in the true sense of the word as keep faith in one way or another."

In addition to enriching their personal faith, those holding the degree in theology can teach classes in religion and Catholic morality in state education centers at the BUP and COU levels, work effectively in pastoral and catechetical action programs and carry out important functions in the parishes and other church centers.

Classification of Students in Spanish Theological Schools  
(School year 1982-1983)

	Priests	Seminar- ians	Monks	Nuns	Laymen (male)	Laymen (female)
Universities						
Deusto	--	28	37	10	18	12
Comillas	10	3	50	14	26	50
Salamanca	70	118	134	26	15	7
Navarra	81	--	4	--	147	40
CSET of Pamplona	1	14	36	5	3	1
Schools						
Granada	28	83	86	40	20	9
Barcelona						
San Francisco de Borja Section	8	10	39	9	9	6
San Paciano Section	19	64	60	23	46	37
Northern Spain						
Burgos Branch	6	99	44	7	26	--
Vitoria Branch	3	21	36	5	5	--
Valencia						
San Vicente Ferrer	41	79	82	10	40	14
	267	519	608	149	355	176

12336

CSO: 3548/48



## NONSOCIALISTS MAINTAIN POLL LEAD AS SDP CRISIS DEEPENS

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 10 Oct 83 p 2

[Editorial by Carin Stenstrom: "SIFO's Figures"]

[Text] The nonsocialist edge in voter opinion still exists, according to the September barometer released by SIFO [Swedish Institute for Public Opinion Polls]. The Social Democrats are still at the relatively low level to which they fell in the August survey. It should be noted that the poll was conducted before last week's stormy events, the high point of which was the big demonstration against wage earner funds. How those events are influencing party sympathies is a question that will not be answered until the next survey comes out. The best explanation for the current figure is probably the impression of paralysis and perplexity being given by the government.

It is no exaggeration to claim that the crisis for the Social Democrats is more serious than SIFO's figure of 42 percent indicates. There is hesitation and uneasiness not only among the marginal voters, but also among the regular supporting troops. The increasingly critical tone being used by Social Democratic editorial writers--usually so docile--is striking. During the past week, several labor newspapers have been sharply critical of the government. It was criticized by several newspapers for misjudgments on the issue of wage earner funds--for disregarding the significance of the demonstration against those funds. Other Social Democratic newspapers disagreed with the government concerning the settlement with the pensioners. In its Saturday issue, ARBETET criticized the government for the higher pay, and FOLKBLADET suggested that the construction placed on it might lead people to start talking about tax evasion. The tone is noticeably disrespectful.

Surely not many voters can avoid comparing Palme's conduct as a member of the opposition when Falldin was prime minister with Falldin's behavior in the same situation. Palme did not hesitate to depict Falldin as the man directly responsible for unemployment, lower real wages, and the general economic crisis. The absence of a similar streak in Falldin's opposition policy is striking and attractive. Perhaps that is one explanation for the fact that the Center Party has been quietly regaining the credibility among voters that it had lost.

11798

CSO: 3650/8

## FINLAND'S PURCHASE OF DRAKEN SEEN AIDING SWEDEN'S SECURITY

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 29 Sep 83 p 8

[Article by Lars Christiansson]

[Text] The Finnish Government's decision to choose Sweden's Draken aircraft for Birkala Airbase in western Finland is good for Sweden from more than the purely economic standpoint. Sweden has thus been spared the existence of an airbase equipped for Soviet MiG-21's only a few minutes' flying time from the Swedish border.

That is the opinion of both military and security policy experts in Sweden.

The government in Helsinki has set aside 195 million marks in the Finnish budget for the purchase of Drakens. That is the equivalent of approximately 265 million kronor. According to reliable reports, Finland intends to purchase 18 Drakens. The total amount of 195 million marks supposedly also includes the cost of spare parts and the cost of modifying the aircraft to meet special Finnish requirements.

If the deal goes through without a hitch, the Drakens will be delivered in time to enter service sometime in 1985.

The third parliamentary committee on defense, which in 1981 submitted to Parliament in Helsinki its proposal for beefing up the Finnish Air Force by the addition of half a wing, took no position on which type of aircraft Finland should choose. It was clear, however, that the choice was between the Swedish Draken and the Soviet MiG-21 fighter plane.

The situation in Finland's trade balance with the Soviet Union indicated that the Soviet aircraft should be bought. Not until now has the government made its decision.

But according to what SVENSKA DAGBLADET has learned, the Finnish Government's decision in favor of the Draken was based not only on economic considerations but also on the military political situation in Scandinavia.

From the standpoint of Swedish military strategy, it would not have been favorable to have MiG's stationed at Birkala Airbase. It would have meant outfitting

the base with loading and fueling equipment meeting Warsaw Pact air force standards.

There are several reasons why Sweden is offering 18 Draken aircraft at a very advantageous price. The normal price for a fully serviceable Draken with many hours of flying time left would be about 20 million kronor. But in this deal, the price will probably drop to 10 million.

#### One Hundred in Mothballs

In Sweden today, there are at least 100 fully serviceable Drakens in mothballs. Their flying times vary. Selling them would also make it possible to realize some of the "dead capital" that those planes represent in today's situation. In connection with the aircraft deal with Finland, there are also strong forces at work to get the money realized from the sale added to the Swedish Air Force's budget, which is more than tight in the current situation. Whether those efforts will succeed or not is uncertain, since the money from this type of arms deal normally goes into the national treasury without being "earmarked."

The Swedish Air Force currently has about 160 Drakens in service. The possibility of closing down three Draken squadrons is being discussed. That would mean taking about 55 Drakens out of service.

#### Balancing Purchases

The Finnish Air Force has 24 Drakens based in Rovaniemi and 28 MiG's in Kuopio in eastern Finland. In light of Finland's neutrality policy, an effort has been made to balance weapons purchases between East and West. Simplifying the picture somewhat, we can say that the Soviet aircraft types are based in eastern Finland, while the Drakens have been stationed in northwestern Finland.

According to the peace treaty following the war, Finland is entitled to have 60 fighter aircraft. Since worn-out aircraft are being retired, the Finnish Air Force will still be within the stipulated limit even after the Swedish aircraft deal is completed.

The Swedish debate about closing down three Draken squadrons has caused some uncertainty on the Finnish side, where it is being wondered whether, if those squadrons were eliminated, the Swedish aircraft industry would maintain its Draken capacity. If the Draken air force wings are eliminated, will that make supplementary purchases more difficult in the future?

11798

CSO: 3650/8

## DETAILS ON REORGANIZATION OF GROUND FORCES

Paris TERRE-INFORMATION in French No 110 Jul-Aug 83 pp 4-5, 8

[Text] The plan for the new army fulfills the objectives set, while fully allowing for the constraints.

The army will thus, in the short run, comprise four large units instead of three--a rapid action force and three corps of field forces realigned for peacetime in personnel and disposition. Their make-up will, however, in emergency or threatening situations, be based on the missions and tasks initially assigned to them. In the long run, a nuclear division will be set up, when the weapons of the HADES system are operative.

With 47,000 men and 5 divisions, the Rapid Action Force [FAR] will be a multi-mission group by its capacity for rapid action. In addition to the 11th Parachute Division, it will include the 9th Marine Infantry Division and the 27th Alpine Division, as they now stand, and the 6th Light Armored Division, formed from the 31st Brigade, with four regiments on AMX 10 RC and VAB long-range armored vehicles. The hard core of this FAR will undoubtedly be the 4th Mobile Air Division, which will replace the present Armored Division in Lorraine, with 120 antitank helicopters, 40 support and protection helicopters and 80 helicopters for manoeuvres, and two infantry regiments well supplied with antitank missiles.

The First Army will still have three corps of field forces, made up of ten divisions. The armored divisions will be more powerful with more tanks, twice as many infantry units and a stronger artillery. Out of these ten divisions, two will be regular, drill-trained army divisions.

For the North Field Forces, the post in Lille will be the symbol of the realignment of the troop positioning, facing Belgium and Holland. The Third Corps will have three divisions (the 1st and Armored Division, the 8th Infantry Division and the 12th Drill Division), instead of a single division as at present. It will number more than 30,000 men.

The Central Corps of Field Forces (First Corps) will keep its headquarters at Metz in Lorraine. Having lost its 4th and 6th Armored Divisions, which are now the 4th Mobile Air Division and the 6th Light Armored Division of the Rapid Action Force, it will have four divisions in peacetime (the 7th and 10th armored divisions, the 14th Drill Division and the 15th Infantry Division). It will number more than 32,000 men.

The East Corps (2nd Corps), finally, will have its headquarters at Baden-Baden. It will keep its current composition of the 1st, 3rd and 5th Armored Divisions stationed in Federal Germany, and will be reinforced by infantry regiments stationed in Alsace and Lorraine, along the border.

With the air corps troops of the French Sector in Berlin, the command and logistics regiments attached to the First Army and the 42,000 men belonging to the 2nd Corp all stationed in the FRG, the French forces in Germany will number at least 50,000 soldiers.

In addition to these four units--the FAR plus three Corps of Field Forces--our ground forces will also include 20,000 soldiers representing troops pre-posed abroad and overseas, and specialized regiments belonging to the general reserves.

The plan calls for only 17 groups to be dissolved, including two infantry and one cavalry unit.

In selecting garrisons, account was taken by operational usefulness and the current condition of the barracks. Moreover, according to the arrangement finally adopted, there will be no areas devoid of a military presence in France.

The results are as follows:

--9 garrisons in France and 3 garrisons in Germany will lose their military posts. These are:

--Granville and de Saint-Lo (staff of 1,400); the latter will probably be taken over by the State Police, with the departure of the 1st Marine Infantry Regiment, transferred to Angouleme;

--Bonifacio and Corte, through the transfer of the 2nd Foreign Infantry Regiment (1,050 persons) in its new division (6th Light Armored Division) to the southeastern part of France. This transfer, which leaves a great deal more troops than the national average in Corsica, allows a savings of 400,000 francs in the defense budget; the cost of new barracks has already been projected;

--Epernay, by dissolving the 34th Regiment of Engineers (720 persons);

--to these should be added the garrisons at Bar-le-Duc (Medical Corps, 230 men); Montmedy (10th RCS [command and support regiment], 240 men); Lons-le-Saunier (60th Infantry Regiment, 730 men), and Sete (81st Infantry Regiment, 700 men); these decisions were all made several years ago, but action on them was deferred for various reasons.

In FRG, with the dissolution of the 501st Train Regiment (700 persons), the functional regrouping of the 2nd Helicopter Regiment at Treves, and the transfer of the Research Squadron of the 13th RDP [Parachute Regiment] (200 men) to Donaueschingen, the garrisons at Bitburg, Friedrichshaffen and Langenargen, which are too out of the way, will be vacated.



At the same time, seven or eight towns in different parts of Germany, and in eastern and southern France, will see their garrisons reduced by a figure ranging between 20 and 30 percent.

#### Objectives

The primary purpose is to make ground forces available to the President of the Republic which, by their organization, means and positioning, will extend the range of credible, foreseeable actions to the maximum. The goal in essence is to make better use of the freedom of action France enjoys by virtue of being the only continental nuclear power directly concerned with any crisis in Europe but which also benefits from absolute independence in decisionmaking.

With this in mind, and with a view to increasing the margin of maneuver of the Army's Commanding Officer over time and space, the following actions are planned:

1. Establishment of a Rapid Action Force (FAR), which would have a single command, be of considerable size, would have a high degree of tactical and strategic mobility--largely as a result of an antitank helicopter force--and would be capable of action on very short notice, anywhere in Europe, using either all or part of its troops.

2. The regrouping of tactical nuclear, air and ground strength into a command directly attached to the Army Chief of Staff, to take advantage of the possibility offered by new materiel (HADES and ASMP) to expand, if necessary, the definition of France's vital interests and make it independent of any ground actions of the First Army.

3. An adjustment in troop organization which shows our determination to be a sure and effective ally.

4. A realignment of the positioning of the ground forces, so as to be better placed to cope with a threat developing across the large northern plain of Europe and thus to mitigate the lack of mobility of the First Army, which has been overly specialized up to now, and to be able to oppose an enemy coming from the central or southern part of Germany.

Finally, even at the cost of a troop redeployment, we needed to increase the mobility and fire-power of our ground forces and, in a difficult economic situation, to support the research, as well as the business and employment, of our arsenals and weapons manufacturers. In fact, it was important that we not miss out on the major technological advances of the future (computer-controlled command and firing, development of air mobility, terminal guidance of missiles, night sighting for firing and tracking missiles, and target search on the battlefield).

It will therefore be impossible to achieve the ambitious objectives of the 1984-88 program without a drastic reduction in overhead costs and a cut in the armed troops of 22,000 men, staggered over 5 years.

## Constraints

First we can rule out a two-army system, with one made up of well-paid career soldiers for noble duties, and the other of conscripted and less well equipped men, for obscure or unpleasant missions.

Then we want to make sure national and international public opinion does not interpret this plan for the Army of the year 2000 as a "lowering of our guard." Thus it is important to do the following:

- set the total number of ground forces at 290,000 soldiers;

- keep 50,000 soldiers in garrisons in Federal Germany;

- not dissolve one of our three current corps of field forces;

- keep the same number of regular army divisions (15), by establishing large units from the army drill schools and by making better use of our reservists.

Finally, a last constraint is to limit the number of regiments to be dissolved, and the number of garrisons to be abandoned or made smaller, to what is absolutely necessary.

## Conclusion

In summary, the plan for the Army makes it possible to meet the commitments made in the programming law for the 1984-88 period at the lowest cost in terms of personnel cutbacks and transfers.


As far as operations are concerned, and specifically in the face of a threat from the north, which is both the most likely and the most dangerous for the Alliance and for our country, the Army is in a position to move earlier and further, thanks to the FAR and especially a larger and better positioned Third Corps of Field Forces.

The arrangement providing for three corps of field forces of varying composition makes it possible to meet our commitments vis-a-vis the Alliance or, according to what the President of the Republic may decide, either to go further or, on the contrary, to defend ourselves by independent action.

## Future Army: Organization of Command

The First Army headquartered at Strasburg is made up of three corps of field forces composed of ten divisions.

- The First Corps at Metz, composed of: the 7th Armored Division headquartered at Besancon; the 10th Armored Division posted at Chalons-sur-Marne; the 14th Light Armored Division, "Drill" Division, posted at Montpellier; and, the 15th Infantry Division, headquartered at Limoges;



Key:

- |   |                                |
|---|--------------------------------|
| 1. Headquarters, Corps of Field Forces and the Rapid Action Force | 9. 10th Armored Division       |
| 2. First Army   | 10. 4th Mobile Air Division    |
| 3. Rapid Action Force   | 11. 1st Armored Division       |
| 4. 11th Parachute Division  | 12. 6th Armored Division       |
| 5. 12th Drift Division  | 13. 3rd Armored Division       |
| 6. 9th Marine Infantry Division                                   | 14. 7th Armored Division       |
| 7. 2nd Armored Division   | 15. 15th Infantry Division     |
| 8. 8th Infantry Division  | 16. 27th Alpine Division       |
|   | 17. 6th Light Armored Division |
|   | 18. 14th Drift Division        |

--The 2nd Corps, headquartered at Baden, and composed of: the 1st Armored Division, stationed at Treves; the 3rd Armored Division, stationed at Fribourg; and, the 5th Armored Division, stationed at Landau;

--The 3rd Corps, headquartered at Lille, composed of: the 2nd Armored Division, stationed at Versailles, the 8th Infantry Division, headquartered at Amiens; and the 12th Light Armored Division, "Drill" Division, headquartered at Saumur.

The Rapid Action Force (FAR), headquartered in the Paris region, comprises five divisions:

--the 4th Mobile Air Division, headquartered at Nancy;

--the 6th Light Armored Division, headquartered in the Southeast;

--the 9th Marine Infantry Division, headquartered at Saint-Malo;

--the 11th Parachute Division, headquartered at Toulouse;

--the 27th Alpine Division, headquartered at Grenoble.

9805

CSO: 3319/40

## TERRITORY, EMPLOYMENT OF PLANNED AIRMOBILE STRIKE FORCE

ARMED DEFENSE NATIONAL in French Oct 83 pp 174-177

[Article by Michel Darfreu: "Airmobility in the Army: a New Dimension, New Possibilities"]

[Text] With the establishment of a major airmobile unit within the Rapid Action Force (FAR), airmobility takes on a new dimension in the French Army.

Recent conflicts in the Middle East, the Malvinas, and the Persian Gulf have demonstrated the importance of the role of the helicopter on the battlefield, particularly in an anti-tank role. This role is bound to grow further, as progress is made in terms of air to ground and air to air missiles and in navigation techniques and equipment. New equipment, in particular, should permit helicopter combat operations at night and in all weather conditions.

The development of operational capabilities arising from the potential use of helicopters has led the U. S. Army to turn its light aviation units into a completely separate combat arm. In France the reorganization of the Army demonstrates the interest shown in airmobility and underlines the evolution of the concept for its employment.

## Innovation: an Airmobile Division

As a major innovation in the French Army, the airmobile division will be a major unit of a totally new kind.

It will have about 7,000 troops assigned to it and will be made up of a division staff, a regiment of command and support helicopters, four combat helicopter regiments, two infantry regiments heavily equipped with anti-tank missiles, and two engineer companies.

As it will have nearly 250 helicopters, half of which will be anti-tank helicopters (UH60), the primary mission of the airmobile division will be rapid intervention in the Central European theater against opposing armored forces, in liaison with the Allies or not, as the government decides.



The basic unit of this division will be the combat helicopter regiment. Its composition will differ slightly from the presently existing helicopter regiment, which is considered too large for the purpose. It will have six helicopter squadrons, each having 10 helicopters. In addition, it will have:

- one squadron of support and protection helicopters (HAP),
- three squadrons of anti-tank helicopters (HAC),
- two squadrons of tactical helicopters [hélicoptères de manoeuvre] (HM).

#### Associating the Anti-Tank and the Support and Protection Helicopters

The very composition of the combat helicopter regiment well demonstrates the privileged place given to the anti-tank helicopter. However, the anti-tank helicopter will not be able to perform its role effectively and for long unless it has help from the support and protection helicopter, which with its gun, its rockets, or its missiles will be able to provide ground support or fight against other helicopters. That is why, beginning as of now, sleek Gazelle SA 341 helicopters will be armed with a 20 mm gun built into its structure. This strengthening of the Gazelle will make it possible to wait for the development of a helicopter specialized in the support and protection role and which will require the following equipment:

- a flat trajectory gun to deal with sudden encounters at short range.
- an air to air missile for use at greater range.

The anti-tank role is now performed adequately by the Gazelle helicopter equipped with the HOT [infrared] missile and by anti-tank groups equipped with Milan surface to surface missiles, carried by the Puma SA 330 helicopter. In order to keep these weapons systems competitive until about 1995, improvements in their night firing capability and in the missile warheads have been undertaken. Beyond 1995 these weapons systems will have to be replaced with the appearance of more advanced technologies in terms of firing at night, observation while moving, and anti-tank missiles of the "fire and forget" type.

In any case only the joint action of the anti-tank and the support and protection helicopter will make it possible to deal with the growing threat represented by armored units supported by large numbers of armed helicopters.

#### Evolution of the Airmobile Concept

Up to the present the light aircraft assigned to the Army have only been given airmobile functions complementary to those of the other combat arms: infantry, tanks, or lightly armored cavalry, in the framework of the movement of major units or in case of rapid, overseas assistance missions. These airmobile functions take place:

- either in the framework of an airmobile operation conducted at the pace of aircraft.

—as in the case of an airborne support which is directly linked to the movements of the ground of other army and services.

Under these conditions the employment of assault helicopter regiments can be envisaged in either a centralized or decentralized way:

—centralized, in emergency situations in liaison with units at the ground, either about the forward edge of recommended actions or defeating bridgeheads, at air air fronts and in gaps between major units, with an essentially anti-tank function, exploiting the capabilities of armed and armoured helicopters, transporting infantry units equipped with the latest anti-tank missile.

—decentralized, particularly in the framework of rapid deployment thrusts, with a full sized in terms of the target.

This doctrine will remain valid at the level of an army corps, which will retain a formation of light Army aircraft organic to it.

On the other hand, a new airborne concept is under consideration to deal with the foreseeable evolution of the threat over the next few years. Large enemy armoured units will remain the principal threat for our ground forces and will be the primary objective of the airborne formations. This threat will be characterized by the constant use of armoured units:

—using technologically improved future tanks including active armor, improved fire control, and anti-helicopter ammunition,

—protected by surface to air weapons systems associating high performance interception war, guns with a very high rate of fire, and self-aiming, supermanoeuvring missiles,

—and supported by armed helicopters and slow, specialized aircraft.

The new concept concerns the centralized employment of a fast-moving and flexible light airborne unit, capable of acting autonomously and having substantial, independent anti-tank firepower. Its capabilities must make it possible for it:

—to be used in cooperation with the First Army against an attack more directly threatening our national territory,

—to intervene immediately, should the decision be made by the president of the republic, alongside the Allies in any zone of the Central European theater,

—to be committed, in whole or in part, outside metropolitan France in the framework of rapid deployment operations.

Experimentation

In order to study the validity of the formation structures, combat procedures, and command and support arrangements, an experiment was undertaken, beginning in December 1984. This experiment involved two distinct stages.

The first, or preliminary stage, conducted within an army corps, had the object of evaluating the very concept of airmobility by means of a totally airmobile group with the name of "Force Eclair" [Lightning Force], composed of two combat helicopter regiments, a regiment of infantry, and engineer elements. This involved studying the employment of this force in Europe, to a depth of as much as 300-600 kilometers.

This experiment, which went into all of the problems raised by airmobile operations, took place in two phases. First, by commitment of "Lightning Force" at a range of about 250 kilometers, a distance allowing light Army aircraft to have an autonomous combat potential in the area after the force was put in place. Then this force was committed at a distance of 300 to 600 kilometers, an extension which raised in particular problems of communications, of logistical support, and Air Force participation. Lessons learned up to now show, at first glance, that:

- the enemy force which "Lightning Force" can take on is an operational maneuver group (GOC) amounting to a reinforced armored division, or two ordinary divisions,
- the tactical mobility of the troops on the ground could be improved with all-terrain light vehicles with trailers,
- employment in mass ensures the best return by achieving "surplus combat power" at decisive times and places.

The test of arrangements on the ground brought out the need for a substantial amount of communications during the movement to the battle area and in the course of action. These were identified with precision, and the means necessary to satisfy these needs were defined, on the basis of the RITA [Integrated, Automatic Transmission Network] system in particular. The use of joint procedures with the Allies will be tested as soon as possible. These exercises also showed that at the combat distances envisaged the force must have total logistical autonomy, particularly in ammunition and fuel. The different logistical aspects were studied, including the initial capacity brought along, an evaluation of consumption per combat day, support for the commitment, and eventual reinforcements.

The second phase of the experiment will benefit from all the lessons learned from the exercise with "Lightning Force," but it will be distinguished from this essentially by the establishment of an autonomous, airmobile brigade, totally independent of an army corps. The principal points to be studied in the framework of the Central European theater concern liaison with the First Army and cooperation both with the French Air Force, including the Tactical Air Forces (FATAC) and the Military Air Transport Command (COTAM), and with the Allies. Furthermore, the respective roles of the different kinds of helicopter squadrons--support/protection, anti-tank, and tactical--will be considered in terms of future equipment.

In the face of an enemy having rapid and powerful armored forces the airmobile division is a combat arm for taking the initiative and for emergency purposes:

- it is a combat arm for taking the initiative because it offers the French Government the possibility of attaching political significance to the concentration

of this force and, if necessary, of undertaking military intervention far beyond our national frontiers.

--it can be used for emergency purposes because it makes it possible to deal with a dangerous local situation or to re-establish the situation within a totally peaceful Allied context.

Moreover, these characteristics are those of all of the Rapid Action force.

#### Table of Organization - Airmobile Division

- 1 Regiment of Command Support Helicopters [RCHC]
- 4 Light Helicopter Regiments [RAC]
- 2 Infantry Regiments
- 2 Engineer Companies

0375

CSO: 3519/55

## MILITARY CODE TO EMPHASIZE ANTICONSTITUTIONAL CRIMES

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 14 Oct 83 p 16

[Text] According to the draft of the military code of justice prepared by the Ministry of Defense and presented to the other governmental departments for consideration, for an order by a superior to be considered not exempt from criminal responsibility by the military, it must be "clearly illegal" and compliance with such an order must obviously involve the commission of a crime, particularly a crime against the Constitution. This text lessens the force of the existing code of justice which underwent a partial reform in 1980. The draft considerably broadens the assumptions for military rebellion.

The reform introduced into the military code by Organic Law 9 on 6 November 1980 retained the required compliance under circumstances in which the military is exempt from criminal responsibility, but it stipulated that "there is no required compliance when orders involve the commission of acts which are contrary to law or to wartime practices or which constitute a crime, especially against the Constitution." The new text, in adding the requirement that a superior's order must be "clearly illegal" and eliminating the reference to what might be contrary to "wartime practices" removes, without a doubt, the possibility that the exemption from required compliance might no longer be applicable.

The draft of the Military Criminal Code is a result of the efforts put forth by a commission for the study and reform of military justice in compliance with the final main provision of the organic law mentioned previously. In February 1982 this commission completed its work which the Ministry of Defense distributed in the form of a report to the legal consultants of that department, the board of the chiefs of staff and to the general headquarters of the three armies, as well as to the top-level councils of the army which had previously requested them from the pertinent judicial military authorities.

Among the observations made during this extremely long consultation process, the Ministry of Defense refers to the objection that the new penal code should be postponed until the promulgation of the new public penal code under which the military penal code is included as a special law. According to the explanation in the memorandum which accompanies the draft, the Ministry of



Defense, although "recognizing that there is considerable substance to the objection," has disregarded it in an attempt to comply with the legal mandate of the final provision of the law mentioned above which formalized the partial reform of the military code.

One of the most significant changes which appear in the draft is a new description of the crime of military revolt as being primarily "political in nature" according to the above-mentioned memorandum and which is given a separate heading. Military personnel who commit the following acts will be considered guilty of military revolt: those who collectively rise up in arms to derogate, abolish or modify the constitution completely or partially; remove the head of state from office or force him to commit an act against his will; prevent free elections for public office in any part of the country; dissolve the court system, the Congress of Deputies or the Senate or prevent them from convening or deliberating or force them to pass a resolution; take over the country or any part of it or any troops or other type of armed force under government command; use or take for oneself or dispossess the government or any of its branches of its powers or deprive it of or hinder it in its free exercise of power.

#### Fifteen to Twenty-Five Years

The penalty for these crimes is from 15 to 25 years in prison for those who would foster or support the revolt and anyone who would flaunt command as an officer of the forces involved. The death sentence could be imposed for such crimes in time of war. The penalty for those in command of a company or similar unit or a higher one is 10 to 20 years, and 15 to 25 years in time of war. For those who only participated in the act, the penalty is 5 to 15 years in prison and 10 to 20 in time of war.

The same heading also identifies crimes of unarmed revolt and sedition for the purpose of committing the crime of revolt and acts of conspiracy, proposition and provocation to commit either of the two crimes, as well as the justification for either of them. Anyone who is implicated in any of the above-mentioned crimes will be exempted from penalties if "he discloses them in time to avoid the consequences." Those who are only participants will also be exempted from penalties if they lay down their arms "before having used them" and if they surrender to the legitimate authorities.

Among other changes, the draft of the military penal code includes for the first time the crime against parliamentary privilege which is put on the same level, in terms of penalties (6 months to 6 years in military prison) as abuse of the flag or emblem.

Also in the draft is a description of the crime of indecent liberties with a person of the same sex, the result of which will be a discharge from military service.

9787

CSO: 3548/42

## SIGNIFICANCE OF ARMS EXPORTS FOR FRENCH ECONOMY

Zuerich NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG in German 15 Oct 83 p 17

[Text] Before the General Assembly of the United Nations, France's chief of state Francois Mitterrand recently took a look at armament and argued for giving the Third World countries the savings from possible disarmament. Progressive rhetoric has long been a part of the arsenal of French socialism before such a public -- just as it was, by the way, before those young voters who gave their votes to the socialists in 1981 because of the socialist anti-colonial position, among other things. But reality is somewhat different. The famous defense policy speech Mitterrand made before the German Bundestag -- even though it is at most contradictory in mood to the position taken in New York -- and the engagements in Chad and Lebanon speak for themselves. The realism and pragmatism of the defense policy in practice corresponds beyond doubt to Mitterrand's basic position. Here lies its decisive foundation.

## The Most Important Profit Position in the Balance of Trade

But the economic aspect, which is sometimes neglected, should not be forgotten. Right now during the country's present economic difficulties this aspect also plays a part in armament decisions. The economic importance of the French armament industry is enormous. Its turnover is estimated at about 80 billion francs. About 300,000 persons are said to be directly employed in this sector. When the subcontractors are taken into consideration, the number of workers dependent upon the armament industry is estimated to be almost a million, spread over about 6,000 firms. The real political-economic significance of the armament industry, however, is only seen clearly in two other key figures: the industry receives about a fifth of the national expenditure for research and development, and without it the foreign trade deficit of the past year (93 billion francs) would have been about a third higher.

In general, one can assume that at least a third of the turnover in this industry goes for export. The contract agreements from abroad for 1982 indeed formed a record amount of 41.6 billion francs, following 33.8 billion francs from the previous year. In the first half of 1983, however, they declined to 19.2 (1982: 26.4) billion francs, about to the 1981 level. Since imports, on the other hand, remain within narrow limits because of France's policy of independence -- their value hardly exceeds one billion francs a year on the average --

the excess in the trade balance achieved in the armament industry is by far the largest of all sectors of the French economy. Without armaments, and on a cif/fob basis, the balance of trade deficit for the past year would therefore have been 151 billion francs. The government always prefers to give the figures on an fob/fob basis including the military sector, and this has produced the well known deficit of 93 billion francs. This range is therefore the extent of the armament industry' contribution in foreign exchange.

In this way, France has established itself as the third most important arms exporter in the world -- a position once occupied by Great Britain. According to Sigri figures, the "market share" was about ten percent in 1982. This may seem small compared to the giants, the U.S. and the Soviet Union, with about 35 percent each, but still, the French arms exports corresponded approximately to those of Great Britain, Germany, and Italy together. In this way they can distribute the high fixed costs (research) somewhat better and also achieve more cost-favorable mass production.

#### Structural Weaknesses

But only at first glance is the arms industry a spearhead in export. The geographical weaknesses in the structure of French foreign trade is particularly applicable to it. About 90 percent of the 1982 exports to 56 countries went mainly to developing countries, and about three quarters went to the Near East and to Maghreb alone. To be sure, a part of the oil bill is paid in this way, but the basic problem of the bad and uncertain payer has not been completely eliminated even in this region that is so rich in "black gold."

The most impressive example is Iraq, which may well be indebted to France to the amount of about 17 billion francs. In 1982, France was the second largest deliverer there with about 15 billion francs worth of material, following the Soviet Union. In addition, there were about nine billion francs worth of non-military purchases. In a relatively complicated agreement, a solution was found that provides for, together with debt conversion and cash payment, retirement of part of the debt with Saudi oil as well. But now, if France continues to support Bagdad with further military deliveries, Paris is also, along with political considerations, following economic logic, for the Coface export risk insurance, for the case when Iraq forfeits payment -- and an overthrow of the Hussein government could include this danger -- amounts to about seven billion francs that the French exporters and contractors must pay.

#### A Spearhead of Technological Development

But the French armament industry is also important for its high research intensity. It is clear that in the process something profitable always come to the civilian sector. In many firms, armament only makes up a part of the total turnover. The technological transfer to the civilian sector is quite clear in this case. All in all, it is estimated that France's military research and development last year required about half of the total government research expenditures. At any rate, the management of Research and Technical Studies, and the technical management of the General Delegation for Armament (DGA),

where the threads of technical development come together, control a budget of 17 billion francs. The main concentration of research falls here in the areas of electronics (25 percent), nuclear technology (21 percent), and aircraft (19 percent). All in all, there may be about 20,000 persons, 3,000 of them engineers, active in the area of military research.

#### Ten Firms

The interconnection of the civilian and military sectors so important for technological development makes statistical differentiation difficult, so that the armament industries can only be vaguely distinguished. Nevertheless, the Thomson group is at the head. Its turnover in the military sector for 1981 was estimated by the economic magazine *LE MONDE ECONOMISTE* to be 14 billion francs. The agreement with the CEE (General Electric Company) has even strengthened the sector. Thomson specialises in electronic material, for example, in radar control equipment. The military section of the Societe nationale industrielle aerospatiale (SNIAS) (10.8 billion francs), however, hardly makes up more than half the total turnover. It is a world-wide leader in helicopter production after Bell and Sikorsky. Beyond this, antitank and antiaircraft missiles are produced in German-French cooperation. Until May of this year, SNIAS was directed by the brother of the French chief of staff, General Jacques Mitman. One hardly needs to point out Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet, which has attained world success with its Mirage, and which has a turnover in the military sector of about ten billion francs. Less well known internationally, on the other hand, is the Direction technique de constructions navales (DTCN), which also has a turnover of ten billion in naval construction. In contrast to the other firms, however, it is, with its export of seven percent, considerably less foreign-oriented. Other firms with considerable turnover in the armament field are Commissariat a l'energie atomique (about 6.5 billion francs armament turnover), Groupement industriel des armements terrestres (6.1 billion francs), the motor manufacturer Snecma (3.4 billion francs), Matra (3.1 billion francs), Societe nationale des poudres et explosives (1.2 billion francs), and Matraiah (1.1 billion francs), which regularly gets headlines because of its economic difficulties.

All these firms -- with the exception of DTGN -- depend less upon armament contracts as such than upon export. In almost all cases, the export share in the armament sector lies over 50 percent, in some cases, like, for example, Dassault, Matra, and Thomson, it is as high as two-thirds. Therefore it might possibly be relatively easy for the government, and for the voters as well, to forget that Pierre Mauroy announced as late as June 1981 that his firm wanted to gradually stop being a large weapons seller of international dimensions. Two million unemployed seem to have pushed the ideological-moral demands into the background just as in the question of nuclear energy.

## BRIEFS

EXIT TAX ABOLITION--Portugal's exit tax will be abolished for foreigners as of January 1984. As was predicted, the new law, which went into effect in March, sparked serious bureaucratic problems in the border areas and vehement protests from the Portuguese hotel industry and travel agents. The government of the autonomous Madeira region unilaterally decided not to collect the tax--designed to bolster the regional budget--from tourists. Faced with this domestic reaction and the reservations expressed by Madrid, the Portuguese Council of Ministers has decided that the exit tax of 1300 pesetas will no longer be applied to foreigners after 31 December. [Text] [Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 30 Oct 83 p 49]

STATE MONOPOLY DECONTROL--The Portuguese Government decided yesterday to open up to private initiative the banking and securities sectors as well as the fertilizer and concrete industries, which until now had all been state-run monopolies. The Council of Ministers decision was made under legislative authorization granted by Parliament. The Portuguese constitution, under the 1982 revision, confirms the irrevocability of those nationalizations that took place in March 1975 and, therefore, the new law delimiting the public, private and cooperative sectors of the economy does not permit the return to private ownership of currently state-run enterprises. The new legislation will exclusively allow the creation of new private enterprises in sectors until now controlled by state monopoly. [Text] [Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 4 Nov 83 p 47]

CSO: 3548/85



## AGRICULTURAL TRADE DEFICIT DECLINES, EXPORTS INCREASE

Madrid ABC in Spanish 27 Sep 83 p 58

/Text/ The agricultural trade deficit has declined during the first 6 months of this year, from 24.5 billion pesetas at this time last year to 18 billion currently, with a rate of coverage this year of 92.9 percent as opposed to 88.9 percent in 1982, according to the latest data prepared by the General Customs Office.

These positive results were made possible by an increase in certain exports, in spite of the impact of the peseta's exchange rate, which during the first half of this year, dropped more than 29 percent with respect to the 1982 dollar. In monetary terms, the increase in imports has been on the order of 20.1 percent, with a 25.5 percent increase in exports.

As far as exports go, citrus, foreign sales of which have increased by 15 percent between January and June of this year as compared to the same period in 1982, stands out among the more significant products, thanks to an increase of 136,000 tons in mandarin oranges and 36,000 tons in lemons. Other products whose exports have increased are fresh tomatoes, with 13,000 additional tons (222,069 as compared to a previous 209,113), as well as practically all fresh fruits; table grapes, apricots, cherries, watermelon, and melons.

Other products whose exports have grown are canned vegetables, 15 percent; wine, 23 percent in the first 6 months, and almonds and hazelnuts, which have also grown notably. In another area, it must be emphasized that olive oil exports for this period will have increased from 16,888 tons last year to 38,138 tons during the first 6 months of 1983.

As far as imports of the more significant agricultural products go, and among the feed grains, based on the latest data available as prepared by the SENPA /National Service for Agricultural Products/, including the first 8 months of the year, a decline has been observed in maize imports--40.8 percent, based on 2,390 tons as compared to 4,182 in the same period last year; sorghum, with a decline of 94 percent--based on 83.1 tons over 1,161, and soy, with a 6.2 percent decline, based on the fact that as of the end of August a total of 1,763 tons had been imported, as opposed to 1,924 in 1982. On the other hand, barley imports have grown considerably, jumping from 309 tons to 1,433.

## EXPORTERS REJECT EEC PROPOSALS ON OLIVE OIL

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 24 Oct 83 p 52

[Article by Andres Ortega]

[Text] Brussels--Jaime Sensat, president of the Spanish Olive Oil Exporters Group, thinks that Spain can make a commitment to the EEC of not increasing its production in this sector but that a 10-year freeze on the integration of the sector into the Community "would be unacceptable." What is more he felt that "the Spanish Government would have to bring pressure to prevent Spanish brands of olive oil from disappearing from the Common Market, otherwise to what avail would it be to have problem of the olive oil sector resolved in 10 years?"

Sensat expressed his satisfaction to the EEC in Brussels over the political commitment made in Luxembourg with respect to Mediterranean products, "as it removes the principal obstacle to the start of Spanish-Community negotiations in the agricultural sector." But what is to be negotiated will have to be determined. Sensat complained, "There is no marriage between the professionals of the sectors and the administration." If the mission of Spain to the EEC appears to be very much interested in the subject, Sensat does not get the same impression from the administration in Madrid, "although businessmen, too, cannot avoid their responsibility."

With the publication of a study conducted by the IRELCO Consulting Firm, the above-mentioned group has begun a European campaign to demythologize the problems posed for the Community by Spanish olive oil. Among the points stressed by Sensat is the fact that the EEC's 20 percent self-sufficiency in vegetable oils will be increased in a satisfactory manner. The cost of the integration of Spanish olive oil into the EEC reportedly will not exceed 91 billion pesetas per year. In a related connection, the surplus of olive oil in the EEC would be 200,000 tons--half from Spanish production--at the end of the transition period in an expanded Community.

The olive oil surplus forecast by a Community of 12 members would be drastically reduced if current demands for aid to production in the EEC were not to exceed the real level of production through fraud, as in the case of Italy and Greece, which exceed the 200,000 tons per year. Sensat recalled that Spain is the only EEC country that now has a census of its olive plantations which was initiated in 1972 and which now covers 80 percent of the hectareage of Spanish olive plantations, at a time when something similar does not exist in Italy and Greece. What is more, production costs in Italy are 39 percent higher than in Spain. Therefore, he said, "The government should negotiate a maximum freeze of 2 years in the sector."

## BELGRADE MEETING FOR REVITALIZATION OF SPANISH-YUGOSLAV TRADE

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 24 Oct 83 p 52

[Article by J. F. Elorriaga]

[Text] Belgrade--The meeting beginning today in Belgrade between the Spanish-Yugoslav Businessmen's Committee will attempt to promote trade between the two countries, which has been seriously hampered by the economic recession of a Yugoslavia that does not wish to buy from anyone who does not buy from it. The devaluation of the dinar, which in 1980 was at 20 per \$1 and has now been lowered to 100 per \$1, is one element favorable to Yugoslav exporters, who are running a race against inflation (50-60 percent this year), under the supervision of the International Monetary Fund.

In the first 6 months of this year, Spain exported goods to Yugoslavia worth about \$20 million (about 300 million pesetas), having purchased goods in that country worth about \$19 million, figures that are much lower than those of 3 and 4 years ago.

An important factor in the Spanish-Yugoslav trade crisis is the decline in Yugoslav demand for Spanish soybean oil, as the United States has made an excellent offer of soybean oil at very favorable terms.

It is not known why Adrian Piera, president of the Madrid Chamber of Commerce gave up the trip to Belgrade at the last minute. The delegation is said to be headed by Ramon Ametllie, vice president of the bilateral committee and president of the EXIMTRADE enterprise.

The Spanish-Yugoslav joint committee will probably meet in December, and both parties hope that by then ENSIDEA [National Iron and Steel Enterprise, Inc.] will have been paid the nearly \$10 million owed to it by Yugoslav enterprises. There are firm promises that the matter will be resolved very shortly. For its part, the Republic of Montenegro is viewing as increasingly remote the day when it will be possible to effect the promised Spanish credit of about \$20 million, as aid for the 1979 earthquake. The Spanish argument: insufficient assurances and guarantees.

Leon Herrera, chief of the Spanish trade office in Belgrade, viewed the establishment of trade enterprises in Spain as an important factor in advancing commercial exchanges in cases such as that of Spain and Yugoslavia. "The Yugoslavs do not wish to buy without selling, and it is very difficult for a Spanish exporter of oranges to find a place to dispose of the pipe he is being offered."

## ANDALUCIA UGT URGES CONCERTED AGRARIAN REFORM

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 24 Oct 83 p 48

[Article by Manuel Fernandez Gonzalez, secretary-general of the Andalucia UGT]

[Text] The draft legislation on Andalucian agrarian reform will be presented today in the Seville locality of Carmona, the place where the Anadalucia Board began the preparatory work on the text of the current Autonomy Statute. For the author of this article, agrarian reform is an old Andalucian demand. The socialist majority in the parliament of Andalucia has the desire and commitment to take action on this question.

The demand for agrarian reform in Andalucia has been around for a long time. Today that old aspiration is a burning issue. I think there is a simple explanation for this: it is now possible. We now have the legal document which mentions it as an objective to be attained (the Autonomy Statute). Now is the time to present a concrete text--the current 1983 period of the Andalucian Parliament sessions. And, basically, there is a desire and commitment on the part of the socialist majority to take action on this question.

And, since it is now possible to implement an authentic agrarian reform, to go further than a generic and somewhat romantic mention of the term, we members of the UGT [General Union of Workers] have started to work seeking to offer our contribution of several structured and viable alternatives. These are embodied in the resolution of the Second Andalucia UGT Congress. This resolution establishes some considerations and criteria, which I shall summarize in the following verbatim quotes:

"It would be utopian to believe that all rural manpower can be accommodated in the countryside in the event of agrarian reform. It would be deceitful and would deceive all the Andalucian peasants. With expropriated lands or lands which may be acquired by direct offers of the owners, a land bank would be created which would be turned over to agricultural professionals, cooperatives and SAT [expansion unknown] of associated work.... The turning over of the lands would be accomplished through a system of long-term leasing at low rentals. In that way, the indebtedness of the farmers and land speculation would be

eliminated; and all the problems implicit in the turning over of real would be resolved, with the land market kept in a continuing state of renewal. [sentence as printed] Agriculture, as any profession, requires specialized training, calling for study and years of practice. Given the low level of training possessed by most of our rural unemployed, we have to develop a program of professional retraining in the rural areas. ...A third degree cooperative, of regional scope, which will serve as an exchange for agricultural products, which will conduct relations abroad and which will devote itself preferentially to the search for markets and set production and quality standards. The industrialization of agricultural production should be linked to a general industrialization of Andalucia.... ...We need to have all the knowledge that is acquired disseminated quickly and intelligibly (pamphlets and books, series of conferences, potentiation of the Agricultural Extension Agency)..."

#### New Elements of Analysis

Other elements of analysis which reflect our positions are as follows:

--The situation is not the same as it was in the 1930s, to cite one example of comparison; from the 211,629 hectares under irrigation in 1930 Andalucia moved up to 329,300 hectares in 1979. Nor do all the farm workers have the same idea of what agrarian reform is: there is awareness of the greater importance of the use of the land than its mere redistribution, which, among other things, would mean the ownership of barely 6 hectares per worker. That is a solution which does not resolve the problems.

--Any agrarian reform law should establish a method of confronting the diversification of regions in Andalucia, using as a basis the kinds of crops now being grown. Also, we cannot forget the profitability factor. If we want to reform an unjust situation, we have to make sure that the new situation in its material aspects is also superior to the one now existing.

By disseminating the text of the resolution of our Second Congress among all our affiliates and at public rallies we Andalusian UGT members have seriously begun our work. It is a trade union task which is perhaps obscure rather than spectacular and brilliant. But ... is that what it is all about? Rationality, debate and knowledge are the most difficult road. We are betting on this road.

And it is clear that the agrarian problem is not the most important problem of Andalucia. Neither the weight of agriculture in the Andalusian economy nor the percentage of its potential manpower, in spite of doubling the average of the more developed regions, makes it comparable to other sectors in the number and kinds of problems. However, it is now a challenge to the socialist movement to consider an agrarian reform which radically changes the inertia of the rural sector in our region. Sooner rather than later we should get to work on it.

8143

CSO: 3348/59



## SOLCHAGA ENVISIONS CREATION OF PRIVATE, PUBLIC SAGUNTO JOBS

Madrid YA in Spanish 27 Sep 83 p 25

/Text/ Carlos Solchaga, minister of industry, said yesterday that the plans submitted by the joint central administration-Valencian community commission include the creation of one private and one public firm, with a workforce of 550 to 600 new employees at the former, and 200 to 400 at the latter. In addition to these firms there will be other small private businesses that will create another 250 jobs. These figures will help to compensate for the 1,300 jobs lost with the closing of the structural rig due to obsolescence of the plant, which was built in 1924.

In concrete terms, the minister was referring to the alternative employment plan submitted yesterday at a meeting held in Valencia by the economic development commission of Sagunto, called by Joan Lerma, president of the Consell, and cochaired by the technical secretary general of the Ministry of Industry and Energy, Oscar Fanjul, together with Segundo Bru, head of the Community Industry Council /CIG/, for the purpose of announcing programmed investments in Camp del Morvedre designed to relocate workers of Altos Hornos del Mediterraneo.

Solchaga indicated that of the 4,000 plant workers at Altos Hornos, some 900 could take early retirement which, he added, is undesirable, but must be done if necessary.

He also indicated that if the campaign being carried out to rescind the decree which affects reconversion of Altos Hornos should succeed, he would resign. In answer to a question from YA, Solchaga said, "If it should be possible for a sufficient number of authenticated signatures to request derogation of the decree through the Cortes, I don't know what the government would do. I only know what I would do; I would go home."

In an opening address to launch the electronics and data processing competition, Sonimag-21, the minister also revealed that one of the measures contemplated by the government within the National Electronic Plan to reconvert this industry is a revision of the state's own purchasing mechanisms. The other three measures contemplated under the plan are demand incentives--through automation of industries and offices, and the introduction of robotics--support of domestic industry through the use of tariff duties during the period leading up to membership in the EEC, and, as a temporary measure, promotion of research.

## SPANISH ACTIVITY IN EQUATORIAL GUINEA PARALYZED

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 13 Oct 83 pp 1, 17

[Article by Juan Roldan]

[Text] Madrid--Yesterday the 300 Spaniards working in Equatorial Guinea for the Office of Cooperation With Equatorial Guinea celebrated the 15th anniversary of the independence of that former Spanish colony in a situation of paralysis and chaos after 3 months without receiving their salaries and weighed down by uncertainty as to future Spanish-Equatorial Guinea relations. According to sources in the Office of Cooperation in Madrid, most of the Spanish workers are thinking about returning permanently to Spain.

At the end of June 1983, the Cortes in the General Budget approved 1.615 billion pesetas in aid for the Republic of Equatorial Guinea for 1983. These funds have not yet been released by the Treasury. At the end of August, this amount was unilaterally reduced by the Ministry of Economy and Finance by 600 million pesetas. This affected all ministerial areas of aid except defense, which refused to allow any reduction of its allotment of 165 million pesetas of which 150 million are used to maintain the two Aviocars.

Four months later, neither the remaining 1 billion pesetas nor the payroll for the members of the Office of Cooperation have been authorized by the Ministry of Finance. The sources added that as a result of this, Spanish activities in Equatorial Guinea are completely paralyzed. Only public health and education, most of which are in the hands of Spanish nuns assigned to numerous missions throughout the territory, continue to function but with shortages of medicines and medical supplies.

Furthermore, there continues to be no clarification of the event which cost the life of the Catalanian missionary Carmen Samaranch, 56 years old, who was assassinated on 2 September 1983 at Ebebibin, near the border with Cameroon and Gabon.

As EL PAIS previously reported, an Equatorial Guinea Army lieutenant and a soldier were arrested as suspects of having committed the assassination. The apparent motive was robbery. The Malabo authorities promised to hold a summary trial promptly. One month after the events, there is no information that the trial has been held.

The Spanish mission charged with renegotiating the Equatorial Guinea foreign debt to Spain has not yet visited the former colony. The debt amounts to 6.5 billion pesetas. The renegotiation of the debt was one of the agreements reached during 3 days of talks between Teodoro Obiang, president of Equatorial Guinea, and the Spanish Government during Obiang's last visit to Madrid in July.

#### The Mongomo Clan

Since the partial dismantling some weeks ago of the Office of Cooperation its head, Ricardo Peydro, has resigned in protest against the lack of interest displayed by the government toward this activity and against the budgetary cuts on aid. The cooperation program, which theoretically is under the African General Directorate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has been bureaucratically sidetracked. On Wednesday the BOLETIN OFICIAL DEL ESTADO [State Official Bulletin] published Peydro's resignation.

The greater and greater concentration of power in the Mongomo clan in the Equatorial Guinea administration, where the recent local elections have made a shameless distribution of posts among Obiang's followers, has increased the Spanish socialist government's conviction that it is a waste of effort and money to attempt to control the use of the assistance given to the cooperation program so that it will help relieve the poverty in which most of the 300,000 inhabitants of Equatorial Guinea live. Sources consulted by EL PAIS have indicated that it is not known whether there is any allocation for assistance to the Malabo regime in the draft of the General Budget for 1984 which has already been approved by the Council of Ministers and sent to the Cortes.

9204

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## ANALYSIS OF KEY ECONOMIC ISSUES FOR NEW GOVERNMENT

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 24 Oct 83 pp 1,7

[Text] Ankara (DUNYA) - The new government which will be formed after the elections of 6 November will be faced with 10 fundamental economic problems, some of which are short term ones and some of which are structural. The newly formed government will take over a debt of more than about 140 billion Turkish Liras to farmers, 40 billion Turkish Liras to the fertilizer industry and 50 billion Turkish Liras to contractors. Furthermore, the foreign debt awaiting the new government amounts to over \$23 billion. And the domestic debt for the long term program linked to the general budget is of the order of 3 trillion Turkish Liras.

The fundamental economic problems the government to be formed after 6 November will have to face, which are related to the long and short term programs for finding solutions, are as follows:

The Acceleration in Price Increases:

In view of a new tendency since 1983 for an acceleration in price increases, it will be necessary for the government which will come to power after 6 November to implement within a short period of time new measures. During the past 12 months the rise in prices has reached a 32.5% rate. For the same preceding period prices had risen by 23.5%.

The Era of Collective Agreements Begins:

The active salary policy followed during the 1980 to 1983 period, with the aim to limit domestic demand, will be abandoned at the beginning of 1984. With the new government entering the era of collective bargaining there will be no possibility of using an active salary policy in order to limit an increase in the demand.

Paying Off Agricultural Products:

In implementing programs to purchase products, the government to come after 6 November will take over a debt to producers in the neighborhood of 140 billion Turkish Liras. Ensuring possibilities to generate resources for paying off this debt and effecting debt payments without delays will be among the chief problems to be tackled by the new government.

#### The Question of The Balance of Payments:

As it became clear that the export targets for 1983 would not be reached, export forecasts for 1984 dropped even below those targeted first for 1983. Particularly, due to the glut that resulted from the increase of exports in the direction of Middle-East markets, it will be imperative for the government that will come to power after 6 November to resort to new measures. Since the financing of ventures with guest worker foreign currency also fell below the expected level, in order to close the deficit in the balance of payments, it is expected that a new era of loans with appropriate terms will begin.

#### Securing Healthy Sources of Revenue for the Public Sector:

The rate of increase in tax returns for 1983 fell below that of the previous year. Since another softening of income tax tariffs at the beginning of 1984 is an article of the constitution, it will become necessary to resort to measures which will increase tax returns without imposing new taxes and, accordingly, to reinforce the authority of the Internal Revenue Service. In order to balance the 1983 budget special emphasis is being put now on the domestic debt. Domestic debts represent at present about 10% of the entire budget revenues.

#### Energy Shortages and Production:

To establish a balance in prices and to create an export oriented surplus of goods, it is necessary to increase production. However, energy shortage is the main hindrance to an increase in production. In fact the energy distribution program, especially for November and December, shows the necessity to lower the working capacity of factories even below the present level.

#### The Problem of Assets for Financial Institutions and Industrial Enterprises:

After the changes made to the Banking Law, the capital increases that will become necessary could raise the question of new changes in the assets of some banks. Furthermore, it is expected that enterprises known to be in a "difficult position" for which no solutions could be found will submit again their petitions for help after 6 November.

Unemployment is also among the most fundamental problems that have been waiting for a solution for a long time, and which the new government will have to face; the work force surplus for 1984 is expected to exceed 20%.

#### Acceleration of Investments:

Fixed capital investments which were of the order of 4.19% in 1983 are programmed to increase at a rate of 6% in 1984. In order to solve the problem of unemployment it is necessary to accelerate investments. However, since domestic savings remained inadequate, this constitutes the greatest impediment to an increase of investments.



### The Housing Problem:

In view of the ever higher housing shortage, it is necessary to give special importance to investments in that sector. At present there is a shortage of about 1 million housing units. It is necessary to find new sources to speed up the implementation of collective housing.

It is expected that the new government which will be formed after 6 November will disclose, parallel to party programs, governmental programs that will include suitable measures for solving this problem. In order to deal with the insufficiency of resources which are at the root of the problem, constitutional amendments are viewed as necessary to make effective measures possible. There is a strong suspicion that the government will meet with difficulties in attempting to create new resources to pay off the debts to farmers, contractors and fertilizer manufacturers, which it will be taking over.

### Approaches in the Open Session:

On the other hand, in the open session organized by the TRT [Turkish Radio and Television] the party leaders expounded their views on some of the fundamental economic problems listed above, within the framework of the questions that were asked. Motherland Party leader Turgut Ozal, in disclosing his views on meeting the Public Sector's need for resources, said that the revenue of some public enterprises could be put up for sale. He said that his party would implement "low rate, widespread taxes." The leader of the Nationalist Democracy Party Turgut Sunalp said that "they intended to suppress some taxes, attempt to collect lost taxes and drop the rates of some other taxes." Populist Party leader Necdet Calp for his part noted that their aim, along with an active implementation of tax laws, was to "reform the existing legislation."

When disclosing his views on the subject of preventing price increases, the MDP [Nationalist Democracy Party] leader Sunalp said that his party would reduce the middleman costs between producer and buyer to a minimum. Sunalp and Ozal noted that it was necessary to bring down, within a short time, the rate of inflation to 10% and that they considered this figure "reasonable." Sunalp said that, in order to solve the problem of unemployment, the capacity of existing installations should be increased and that his party would also focus on long term family planning. While Calp said that they would concentrate on massive investments to fight unemployment as well as on the housing sector, Ozal stated that the problem of unemployment could be solved by a 7% rate of recovery. Ozal also added to his words that formal procedures would be sped up and that special emphasis would be put on housing investments.

12278

CSO: 3554/44

## PROFIT, LOSS FIGURES FOR SEE'S FINALIZED

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 14 Oct 83 p 5

[Text] According to final accounting figures published for last year's activities of 35 state economic enterprises, these organizations, excluding the ones engaged in monopoly activities, suffered huge losses instead of generating capital.

The final budget summaries given in an annex to the budget bill submitted to the Consultative Assembly show that in 1982, the 35 administrator SEE's jointly earned 198 billion 559 million lira in profits before taxes against 83 billion 809 million in losses. The consolidated profit balance that remains after subtracting the losses from the gains is 79 billion 260 million lira.

## Which SEE's Made Money?

A very interesting picture emerges when one looks at the accounts of the organizations which generated profits or losses on a case-by-case basis. Turkey Petroleum (TPAO) alone made over 77 billion lira while TEK, one of the monopolies as well, earned 42 billion in profits. Petrol Ofisi in its gasoline distribution branch, earned 5 billion lira. If one subtracts the total earnings of these three energy monopolies from the overall profit balance, the SEE's show a 10 billion lira loss. Furthermore the PTT--through its monopoly services--earned 27 billion 764 million lira. If one excludes the PTT's earnings from the SEE's profits, the results are dramatic.

## The Loss Recordholders

On the debit side, Turkey Demir-Celik Enterprises leads the list with 31 billion 630 million lira in losses. After Demir-Celik, SEKA lost 15 billion 517 million lira; D. Denizyollari [maritime lines] 11 billion 361 million; D. Demiryollari [railroads] 11 billion lira; Sumerbank 5 billion lira and the Et Balik [meat and fish] enterprise 4 billion 916 million lira.

Experts noted that the SEE's which were able to make profits were those which operated as monopolies but that enterprises such as Sumerbank and Sut Industries cement, which were active in the same areas as the private sector, continued to drain the treasury. No one has been able to do anything about these they said. It was also pointed out that operations which lost money even though they were monopolies, such as Demir-Celik and SEKA, along with their own internal technical difficulties had administrative weaknesses and severe financing problems.

## KOC TO MANUFACTURE ENGINES, TRUCKS UNDER FORD LICENSE

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 14 Oct 83 pp 1,10

[Text] Koc Holding has announced that it will manufacture trucks and engines under Ford license. Ford Europe Inc. president E.J. Blanch and Ford Direct Markets Inc. president J.A. Kordick came to Istanbul yesterday by private jet for the announcement and for the "22nd. Ford Marketers Meeting."

Koc Holding chairman of the board Vehbi Koc gave a speech at a dinner he hosted for the Ford officials yesterday evening.

## Vehbi Koc's Speech

"In 1928 we began our ties with Ford with the Ankara Ford Agency. In those days a Ford automobile cost 1400 Turkish lira and a Ford truck 1800 TL. The first year, we considered ourselves very fortunate when we sold 60 units. In 1928, in order to market Ford company products in the Middle East and in the Balkans, an assembly plant was set up in Istanbul, at Tophane. For various reasons this plant was forced to shut down in 1931. After a series of losses it was withdrawn from Turkey. It was during this time that we purchased Ford's Istanbul and Izmir regional agencies. My heartfelt desire was to bring Ford and its capital to Turkey. My first meeting with Henry Ford II was in Detroit on 9 November 1956. I explained my dream to him. There was some hope as the result of the long talks that went on for 55 days in the U.S. But, after I returned to Turkey, matters dragged on and nothing came of the effort."

"After thinking matters over for quite some time, we established Otosan in 1960, and, reaching a licensing agreement with Ford, we began assembly of Ford trucks. We also put Ford engines in the Anatolian cars that we manufactured."

"As the years passed, side industries developed in the country. This required an increase in the percentage of local production. We undertook efforts to produce here, under Ford license, the motors for the Ford trucks that we were assembling in Turkey and we signed a new agreement with Ford. As a result of this agreement, we were able to produce the latest Ford Cargo trucks equipped with the Dover diesel engine."

"Meanwhile, the talks that had been going on for 12 years on the question of a partnership association with Ford bore fruit. The government gave the required approval and this partnership will begin on 15 October 1983."

## REJECTION OF ADDITIONAL INCENTIVES FOR MARITIME SECTOR

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 24 Oct 83 pp 1,7

[Article by Taylan Erten "Foreign-currency Availability an Obstacle to Additional Incentives for Merchant Marine]

[Text] Ankara - The Istanbul Maritime Chamber of Commerce petition, consisting of 48 articles, for developing the commercial maritime sector by securing additional incentives, was "largely" rejected by the 9 ministries and the 3 organizations involved on the grounds of resources available, the monetary-credit policy and the limitations of the existing legislation.

The report of the Istanbul Maritime Chamber of Commerce petitioning to have their demands granted was submitted to Premier Bulend Ulusu and was answered, with the coordination of the Prime Ministry Maritime Under-Secretariat, by the ministries directly concerned with the matter: Finance, Transportation, Commerce, Public Works, The Interior, Health and Social Welfare, Energy and Natural Resources, Customs and Monopoly, Industry and Technology together with the State Planning Organization, the Central Bank and the Prime Ministry Maritime Under-Secretariat, within "the limits of their competence"; their conclusions were submitted to Premier Bulend Ulusu.

While stressing that the demands of the Chamber of Commerce regarding "the lowering of freight costs, additional incentives and protective measures, the removal of bureaucratic obstructions, naval training and various other progressive measures," which consisted of 5 parts, could not be granted on the whole, the answers given to important demands by the relative institutions are as follows:

The Ministry of Finance

The Ministry rejected, among others, the demand that people in shipping be exempted from income tax for the duration of voyages. The Ministry pointed out that this request went against Income Tax Law No 193 for the reason that in the legislation "no article could be found regarding partial or total exemption from income tax of revenues derived by shipowners who conveyed oil with tankers under the Turkish flag or by seamen, both being subject to taxation."

The Ministry let it be known that the elimination of the 15% expenditure tax paid by shipping insurance companies would require changing the law and that, should a change be made, this would be taken into consideration; it also answered as follows the request to "eliminate the difficulties arising from nominal



foreign-currency purchase and/or sale procedures or from differences in exchange rates":

"If procedures do not take into account differences in price in the purchase and/or sale of foreign-currency, other sectors that earn foreign-currency through their activities might make the same demand; this could interfere with part of the profits of the relevant banks and it is deemed that this would lead to the dissolution of the whole system." On the same subject, the Central Bank also pointed out that "there was a need for some flexibility which would ensure the implementation of a motion to disregard differences in rates of exchange in the case of nominal foreign-currency purchase and/or sale procedures; however, when foreign-currency is obtained through services rendered abroad but is not brought to Turkey in due time, it is imperative to take into account differences in the rates of exchange."

The Ministry of Finance turned down the request to "eliminate the transportation tax" on the grounds that "it would cause a prejudice to the other various means of transportation as well as being in opposition to the principle of the value-added tax." The Ministry also responded as follows to the demand that "new protective measures ensure that ships under the Turkish flag transport import-export freight":

"The Prime Ministry Maritime Under-Secretariat finds the expression of the balance of prices achieved under its coordination and of the results obtained in the figures which have emerged and which should not give any cause for complaint to our shipowners. It is a well known fact that a blatant protectionism would have adverse repercussions on the international scene."

Along the same lines, the report also mentions that freight subventions for long distance transportation, which had been contemplated at first, were no longer being considered. The Ministry of Finance, in replying to the Istanbul Maritime Chamber of Commerce request to this effect, stated that "implementing a premium exchange rate on freight related foreign-currency" went against the premise that "the government had opted not to follow a policy of multiple rates of exchange which, besides, was a requisite of international regulations."

#### The Ministry of Transportation

The request of the Istanbul Maritime Chamber of Commerce to "apply variable tariffs to the health tax and to lighthouse and salvage fees" was turned down by the Ministry of Transportation. In explaining the reasons for its refusal the Ministry expressed the following views:

"Lighthouse and salvage fees were set by a secret resolution of the Cabinet, dated February 7 1983 and No 83/6032, at US \$0.8063 equivalent to a gold franc. Fees were thus raised by about 10 times in comparison to those applied formerly. Lighthouse and salvage fees related to the Straits being an international matter, we are of the opinion that it should also be viewed from the angle of our foreign relations."

As for the proposal to "sever the connection between the health tax and the dollar" it was rejected by the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare which



said this went against the Montreux Agreement and the Health Tax Law.

#### The Central Bank

The sector's request that "The bills toward expanding and improving the Merchant Marine, which have 10 years left to maturity, should be allowed rediscounts and advances" was turned down with the comment that "existing measures are adequate." In this context, the Central Bank pointed out that medium term credits for the purchase of ships benefited from 5 year terms while ship and shipyard building credits were allowed 8 year terms and it contented itself with adding that investment credits granted meanwhile, which had remained incomplete, were generally suspended for 10 to 11 years.

#### The Ministry of Industry

The plea of the Istanbul Maritime Chamber of Commerce "Not to require certificates of origin, port documents or inventories for machinery and equipment used to build ships within the country" was found unsuitable by the Ministry of Industry and Technology. The Ministry warned that "its duty was to protect and promote domestic industry" and let it be known that only in cases where it was definitely not possible to manufacture at home the necessary machinery and equipment for ships and shipyards "import facilities were available within the general framework of the imports regime."

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## DISAGREEMENT OVER ATHENS AREA POLLUTION PROBLEM

Athens 1 KATHIMERINI in Greek 16-17 Oct 83 p 2

[Text] It is rumored that changes will be made in the directorial staff of the Athens Environmental and Pollution Control Program [PERPA] inasmuch as the leadership of the Urban Planning and Environment Ministry [YKhOP] is determined to cancel the contract of the present director A. Skiotis which formally expires early in November.

The removal of the chemist-environmentalist professor (who was recalled from Australia in the spring of last year) will be explained officially as a simple interruption of collaboration. This is provided, moreover, in the contract (which was renewed in June 1983) but it is also Skiotis' desire because he wants to return to his academic duties abroad. In essence, however, the change assumes the form of a restructure since the disputes between PERPA's director and the appropriate minister were frequent about the handlings which concern especially "Nefos" [cloud over Athens] "political" problem. More specifically, YKhOP is under the impression that PERPA should be more effective; should have given practical solutions which would protect the ministry from the opposition's attacks; should have functioned more like an action mechanism than a group performing studies and research; and should have developed initiatives which would free the central services from additional duties. For all these--it is said--the responsibility lies with PERPA's director who, being a professor, not only was unable to adjust to the "political" vote the position entails but was also ignorant of the Greek conditions (he was born in China and for many years has lived in Australia).

On the other hand, the supporters of the present PERPA "atmosphere" claim that any problems in the agency's efficiency are due to the inability of YKhOP to free PERPA of the bureaucracy and to cooperate in a positive way with its leadership. (It is said indicatively that in the last 5 months Skiotis was able to meet with Minister Tritsis only once...) But Skiotis himself never tried to hide the difficulties which blocked his efforts during his term of service. As he had pointed out to the Technical Chamber of Greece. PERPA was unable to get even a library where the specialists and scientists could follow the developments in the field of environment.

Of primary interest, however, is the fact that PERPA was unable to become autonomous administratively. As a result its actions were delayed because it always waited for ministry approval. Skiotis had requested from the very

beginning that PERPA be independent and was always told that its autonomy would come with the establishment of a Unified Environmental Agency which, however, is still in the planning stage. Thus, not only did Skiotis collect his salary 3 months late (and after the personal intervention of Tritsis) but the procedure of hiring specialists usually lasted 5 to 6 months.

According to PERPA sources the Skiotis-Tritsis differences have their roots in two issues: first, to the fact that the first believes that time is of the essence in solving the "nefos" problem (study of situations and causes, procurement of scientific organs, measurements, etc.) while Tritsis, assessing the "political" cost for every day of "nefos," demands effective measures. Second, Skiotis' scientific position is that the automobile is the greatest of all causes of pollution while Tritsis and the majority of public opinion believe that the Attiki basin's pollution is decisively due to the industrial establishments.

It is reported that the change in PERPA's leadership will be followed by a change in the agency's orientation to a more "practical direction." It is thus indicated that Skiotis will be replaced by Madame E. Valiantza who is a specialist in environmental problems. She is highly esteemed by the YKOP leadership and knows well the sensitive sector of "taking anti-pollution measures."

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